Exact conditions for evolutionary stability in indirect reciprocity under noise
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866916945776869376 |
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| author | Glynatsi, Nikoleta E. Hilbe, Christian Murase, Yohsuke |
| author_facet | Glynatsi, Nikoleta E. Hilbe, Christian Murase, Yohsuke |
| contents | Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism for large-scale cooperation. This mechanism captures the insight that in part, people help others to build and maintain a good reputation. To enable such cooperation, appropriate social norms are essential. They specify how individuals should act based on each others' reputations, and how reputations are updated in response to individual actions. Although previous work has identified several norms that sustain cooperation, a complete analytical characterization of all evolutionarily stable norms remains lacking, especially when assessments or actions are noisy. In this study, we provide such a characterization for the public assessment regime. This characterization reproduces known results, such as the leading eight norms, but it extends to more general cases, allowing for various types of errors and additional actions including costly punishment. We also identify norms that impose a fixed payoff on any mutant strategy, analogous to the zero-determinant strategies in direct reciprocity. These results offer a rigorous foundation for understanding the evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity and the critical role of social norms. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_08006 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Exact conditions for evolutionary stability in indirect reciprocity under noise Glynatsi, Nikoleta E. Hilbe, Christian Murase, Yohsuke Populations and Evolution Computer Science and Game Theory Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism for large-scale cooperation. This mechanism captures the insight that in part, people help others to build and maintain a good reputation. To enable such cooperation, appropriate social norms are essential. They specify how individuals should act based on each others' reputations, and how reputations are updated in response to individual actions. Although previous work has identified several norms that sustain cooperation, a complete analytical characterization of all evolutionarily stable norms remains lacking, especially when assessments or actions are noisy. In this study, we provide such a characterization for the public assessment regime. This characterization reproduces known results, such as the leading eight norms, but it extends to more general cases, allowing for various types of errors and additional actions including costly punishment. We also identify norms that impose a fixed payoff on any mutant strategy, analogous to the zero-determinant strategies in direct reciprocity. These results offer a rigorous foundation for understanding the evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity and the critical role of social norms. |
| title | Exact conditions for evolutionary stability in indirect reciprocity under noise |
| topic | Populations and Evolution Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.08006 |