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Main Authors: Xiang, Zihang, Wang, Tianhao, Xiao, Hanshen, Tian, Yuan, Wang, Di
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.08704
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author Xiang, Zihang
Wang, Tianhao
Xiao, Hanshen
Tian, Yuan
Wang, Di
author_facet Xiang, Zihang
Wang, Tianhao
Xiao, Hanshen
Tian, Yuan
Wang, Di
contents In this paper, we study the problem of privacy audit in one run and show that our method achieves tight audit results for various differentially private protocols. This includes obtaining tight results for auditing $(\varepsilon,δ)$-DP algorithms where all previous work fails to achieve in any parameter setups. We first formulate a framework for privacy audit \textit{in one run} with refinement compared with previous work. Then, based on modeling privacy by the $f$-DP formulation, we study the implications of our framework to obtain a theoretically justified lower bound for privacy audit. In the experiment, we compare with previous work and show that our audit method outperforms the rest in auditing various differentially private algorithms. We also provide experiments that give contrasting conclusions to previous work on the parameter settings for privacy audits in one run.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_08704
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Tight Privacy Audit in One Run
Xiang, Zihang
Wang, Tianhao
Xiao, Hanshen
Tian, Yuan
Wang, Di
Cryptography and Security
In this paper, we study the problem of privacy audit in one run and show that our method achieves tight audit results for various differentially private protocols. This includes obtaining tight results for auditing $(\varepsilon,δ)$-DP algorithms where all previous work fails to achieve in any parameter setups. We first formulate a framework for privacy audit \textit{in one run} with refinement compared with previous work. Then, based on modeling privacy by the $f$-DP formulation, we study the implications of our framework to obtain a theoretically justified lower bound for privacy audit. In the experiment, we compare with previous work and show that our audit method outperforms the rest in auditing various differentially private algorithms. We also provide experiments that give contrasting conclusions to previous work on the parameter settings for privacy audits in one run.
title Tight Privacy Audit in One Run
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.08704