Strategic Tradeoffs Between Humans and AI in Multi-Agent Bargaining
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866911394817900544 |
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| author | Qian, Crystal Zhu, Kehang Horton, John Manning, Benjamin S. Tsai, Vivian Wexler, James Thain, Nithum |
| author_facet | Qian, Crystal Zhu, Kehang Horton, John Manning, Benjamin S. Tsai, Vivian Wexler, James Thain, Nithum |
| contents | Markets increasingly accommodate large language models (LLMs) as autonomous decision-making agents. As this transition occurs, it becomes critical to evaluate how these agents behave relative to their human and task-specific statistical predecessors. In this work, we present results from an empirical study comparing humans (N=216), multiple frontier LLMs, and customized Bayesian agents in dynamic multi-player bargaining games under identical conditions. Bayesian agents extract the highest surplus with aggressive trade proposals that are frequently rejected. Humans and LLMs achieve comparable aggregate surplus within their groups, but exhibit different trading strategies. LLMs favor conservative, concessionary proposals that are usually accepted by other LLMs, while humans propose trades that are consistent with fairness norms but are more likely to be rejected. These findings highlight that performance parity -- a common benchmark in agent evaluation -- can mask substantive procedural differences in how LLMs behave in complex multi-agent interactions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_09071 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic Tradeoffs Between Humans and AI in Multi-Agent Bargaining Qian, Crystal Zhu, Kehang Horton, John Manning, Benjamin S. Tsai, Vivian Wexler, James Thain, Nithum Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory Human-Computer Interaction Markets increasingly accommodate large language models (LLMs) as autonomous decision-making agents. As this transition occurs, it becomes critical to evaluate how these agents behave relative to their human and task-specific statistical predecessors. In this work, we present results from an empirical study comparing humans (N=216), multiple frontier LLMs, and customized Bayesian agents in dynamic multi-player bargaining games under identical conditions. Bayesian agents extract the highest surplus with aggressive trade proposals that are frequently rejected. Humans and LLMs achieve comparable aggregate surplus within their groups, but exhibit different trading strategies. LLMs favor conservative, concessionary proposals that are usually accepted by other LLMs, while humans propose trades that are consistent with fairness norms but are more likely to be rejected. These findings highlight that performance parity -- a common benchmark in agent evaluation -- can mask substantive procedural differences in how LLMs behave in complex multi-agent interactions. |
| title | Strategic Tradeoffs Between Humans and AI in Multi-Agent Bargaining |
| topic | Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory Human-Computer Interaction |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.09071 |