The value of conceptual knowledge
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908827140489216 |
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| author | Davies, Benjamin Sankar, Anirudh |
| author_facet | Davies, Benjamin Sankar, Anirudh |
| contents | We study the instrumental value of conceptual knowledge when making statistical decisions. Such knowledge tells agents how unknown, payoff-relevant states relate. It is distinct from the statistical knowledge gained from observing signals of those states. We formalize this distinction in a tractable framework used by economists and statisticians. Conceptual knowledge is valuable because it empowers agents to design more informative signals. It is more valuable when states are more "reducible": when they can be explained with fewer common concepts. Its value is non-monotone in the number of signals and vanishes when agents have infinitely many signals. Agents who know more concepts can attain the same payoffs with fewer signals. This is especially true when states are highly reducible. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_09170 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The value of conceptual knowledge Davies, Benjamin Sankar, Anirudh Theoretical Economics We study the instrumental value of conceptual knowledge when making statistical decisions. Such knowledge tells agents how unknown, payoff-relevant states relate. It is distinct from the statistical knowledge gained from observing signals of those states. We formalize this distinction in a tractable framework used by economists and statisticians. Conceptual knowledge is valuable because it empowers agents to design more informative signals. It is more valuable when states are more "reducible": when they can be explained with fewer common concepts. Its value is non-monotone in the number of signals and vanishes when agents have infinitely many signals. Agents who know more concepts can attain the same payoffs with fewer signals. This is especially true when states are highly reducible. |
| title | The value of conceptual knowledge |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.09170 |