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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.09621 |
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| _version_ | 1866917247394512896 |
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| author | Bizzotto, Jacopo Hancart, Nathan |
| author_facet | Bizzotto, Jacopo Hancart, Nathan |
| contents | We study multidimensional cheap talk with simple language and aligned preferences. An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Even though the expert and the decision-maker share the same payoffs, the use of simple language introduces strategic frictions. As a result, equilibrium payoffs may be lower than those achievable under commitment to a score. Additionally, under quadratic-loss utility, any equilibrium score must be linear in the state or discrete. Finally, for normally distributed states, we characterize the set of equilibrium linear scores and show that it consists of the ex-ante best and worst linear scores. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_09621 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Simple Communication Bizzotto, Jacopo Hancart, Nathan Theoretical Economics We study multidimensional cheap talk with simple language and aligned preferences. An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Even though the expert and the decision-maker share the same payoffs, the use of simple language introduces strategic frictions. As a result, equilibrium payoffs may be lower than those achievable under commitment to a score. Additionally, under quadratic-loss utility, any equilibrium score must be linear in the state or discrete. Finally, for normally distributed states, we characterize the set of equilibrium linear scores and show that it consists of the ex-ante best and worst linear scores. |
| title | Simple Communication |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.09621 |