Choice Paralysis in Evolutionary Games
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866909905034674176 |
|---|---|
| author | Anderson, Brendon G. |
| author_facet | Anderson, Brendon G. |
| contents | In this paper, we consider finite-strategy approximations of infinite-strategy evolutionary games. We prove that such approximations converge to the true dynamics over finite-time intervals, under mild regularity conditions which are satisfied by classical examples, e.g., the replicator dynamics. We identify and formalize novel characteristics in evolutionary games: choice mobility, and its complement choice paralysis. Choice mobility is shown to be a key sufficient condition for the long-time limiting behavior of finite-strategy approximations to coincide with that of the true infinite-strategy game. An illustrative example is constructed to showcase how choice paralysis may lead to the infinite-strategy game getting "stuck," even though every finite approximation converges to equilibrium. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_10567 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Choice Paralysis in Evolutionary Games Anderson, Brendon G. Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Dynamical Systems 91A22 In this paper, we consider finite-strategy approximations of infinite-strategy evolutionary games. We prove that such approximations converge to the true dynamics over finite-time intervals, under mild regularity conditions which are satisfied by classical examples, e.g., the replicator dynamics. We identify and formalize novel characteristics in evolutionary games: choice mobility, and its complement choice paralysis. Choice mobility is shown to be a key sufficient condition for the long-time limiting behavior of finite-strategy approximations to coincide with that of the true infinite-strategy game. An illustrative example is constructed to showcase how choice paralysis may lead to the infinite-strategy game getting "stuck," even though every finite approximation converges to equilibrium. |
| title | Choice Paralysis in Evolutionary Games |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Dynamical Systems 91A22 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.10567 |