Matching to two sides
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908537990414336 |
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| author | Huang, Chao |
| author_facet | Huang, Chao |
| contents | This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations exhibit same-side complementarity and cross-side substitutability. Our results apply to pick-side matching problems and membership competition in online duopoly markets. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_10942 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Matching to two sides Huang, Chao Theoretical Economics This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations exhibit same-side complementarity and cross-side substitutability. Our results apply to pick-side matching problems and membership competition in online duopoly markets. |
| title | Matching to two sides |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.10942 |