Partially rational preferences under ambiguity

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Nakamura, Kensei, Yanagita, Shohei
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2025
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author Nakamura, Kensei
Yanagita, Shohei
author_facet Nakamura, Kensei
Yanagita, Shohei
contents Completeness and transitivity are standard rationality conditions in economics. However, under ambiguity, decision makers sometimes violate these requirements because of the difficulty of forming accurate predictions about ambiguous events. Motivated by this, we study various ambiguity preferences that partially satisfy completeness and transitivity. Our characterization results show that completeness and a novel yet natural weakening of transitivity correspond to two opposite ways of using multiple probability distributions in mind; that is, these two axioms have dual implications at the level of cognitive processes for ambiguity.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_11660
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Partially rational preferences under ambiguity
Nakamura, Kensei
Yanagita, Shohei
Theoretical Economics
Completeness and transitivity are standard rationality conditions in economics. However, under ambiguity, decision makers sometimes violate these requirements because of the difficulty of forming accurate predictions about ambiguous events. Motivated by this, we study various ambiguity preferences that partially satisfy completeness and transitivity. Our characterization results show that completeness and a novel yet natural weakening of transitivity correspond to two opposite ways of using multiple probability distributions in mind; that is, these two axioms have dual implications at the level of cognitive processes for ambiguity.
title Partially rational preferences under ambiguity
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.11660