A Practical Adversarial Attack against Sequence-based Deep Learning Malware Classifiers
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| author | Tan, Kai Zhan, Dongyang Ye, Lin Zhang, Hongli Fang, Binxing |
| author_facet | Tan, Kai Zhan, Dongyang Ye, Lin Zhang, Hongli Fang, Binxing |
| contents | Sequence-based deep learning models (e.g., RNNs), can detect malware by analyzing its behavioral sequences. Meanwhile, these models are susceptible to adversarial attacks. Attackers can create adversarial samples that alter the sequence characteristics of behavior sequences to deceive malware classifiers. The existing methods for generating adversarial samples typically involve deleting or replacing crucial behaviors in the original data sequences, or inserting benign behaviors that may violate the behavior constraints. However, these methods that directly manipulate sequences make adversarial samples difficult to implement or apply in practice. In this paper, we propose an adversarial attack approach based on Deep Q-Network and a heuristic backtracking search strategy, which can generate perturbation sequences that satisfy practical conditions for successful attacks. Subsequently, we utilize a novel transformation approach that maps modifications back to the source code, thereby avoiding the need to directly modify the behavior log sequences. We conduct an evaluation of our approach, and the results confirm its effectiveness in generating adversarial samples from real-world malware behavior sequences, which have a high success rate in evading anomaly detection models. Furthermore, our approach is practical and can generate adversarial samples while maintaining the functionality of the modified software. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_11836 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Practical Adversarial Attack against Sequence-based Deep Learning Malware Classifiers Tan, Kai Zhan, Dongyang Ye, Lin Zhang, Hongli Fang, Binxing Cryptography and Security Software Engineering Sequence-based deep learning models (e.g., RNNs), can detect malware by analyzing its behavioral sequences. Meanwhile, these models are susceptible to adversarial attacks. Attackers can create adversarial samples that alter the sequence characteristics of behavior sequences to deceive malware classifiers. The existing methods for generating adversarial samples typically involve deleting or replacing crucial behaviors in the original data sequences, or inserting benign behaviors that may violate the behavior constraints. However, these methods that directly manipulate sequences make adversarial samples difficult to implement or apply in practice. In this paper, we propose an adversarial attack approach based on Deep Q-Network and a heuristic backtracking search strategy, which can generate perturbation sequences that satisfy practical conditions for successful attacks. Subsequently, we utilize a novel transformation approach that maps modifications back to the source code, thereby avoiding the need to directly modify the behavior log sequences. We conduct an evaluation of our approach, and the results confirm its effectiveness in generating adversarial samples from real-world malware behavior sequences, which have a high success rate in evading anomaly detection models. Furthermore, our approach is practical and can generate adversarial samples while maintaining the functionality of the modified software. |
| title | A Practical Adversarial Attack against Sequence-based Deep Learning Malware Classifiers |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Software Engineering |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.11836 |