AI Wellbeing
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866909788721381376 |
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| author | Goldstein, Simon Kirk-Giannini, Cameron Domenico |
| author_facet | Goldstein, Simon Kirk-Giannini, Cameron Domenico |
| contents | Under what conditions would an artificially intelligent system have wellbeing? Despite its obvious bearing on the ethics of human interactions with artificial systems, this question has received little attention. Because all major theories of wellbeing hold that an individual's welfare level is partially determined by their mental life, we begin by considering whether artificial systems have mental states. We show that a wide range of theories of mental states, when combined with leading theories of wellbeing, predict that certain existing artificial systems have wellbeing. While we do not claim to demonstrate conclusively that AI systems have wellbeing, we argue that our metaphysical and moral uncertainty about AI wellbeing requires us dramatically to reassess our relationship with the intelligent systems we create. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_11913 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | AI Wellbeing Goldstein, Simon Kirk-Giannini, Cameron Domenico Computers and Society Under what conditions would an artificially intelligent system have wellbeing? Despite its obvious bearing on the ethics of human interactions with artificial systems, this question has received little attention. Because all major theories of wellbeing hold that an individual's welfare level is partially determined by their mental life, we begin by considering whether artificial systems have mental states. We show that a wide range of theories of mental states, when combined with leading theories of wellbeing, predict that certain existing artificial systems have wellbeing. While we do not claim to demonstrate conclusively that AI systems have wellbeing, we argue that our metaphysical and moral uncertainty about AI wellbeing requires us dramatically to reassess our relationship with the intelligent systems we create. |
| title | AI Wellbeing |
| topic | Computers and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.11913 |