zkToken: Empowering Holders to Limit Revocation Checks for Verifiable Credentials
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866918141220618240 |
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| author | Manimaran, Praveensankar Raikwar, Mayank Garrett, Thiago da Conceição, Arlindo F. Jehl, Leander Vitenberg, Roman |
| author_facet | Manimaran, Praveensankar Raikwar, Mayank Garrett, Thiago da Conceição, Arlindo F. Jehl, Leander Vitenberg, Roman |
| contents | Systems managing Verifiable Credentials are becoming increasingly popular. Unfortunately, their support for revoking previously issued credentials allows verifiers to effectively monitor the validity of the credentials, which is sensitive information. While the issue started to gain recognition, no adequate solution has been proposed so far.
In this work, we propose a novel framework for time-limited continuous verification. The holder is able to individually configure the verification period when sharing information with the verifier, and the system guarantees proven untraceability of the revocation status after the verification period expires. Different from existing systems, the implementation adopts a more scalable blacklist approach where tokens corresponding to revoked credentials are stored in the registry. The approach employs ZK proofs that allow holders to prove non-membership in the blacklist. In addition to theoretically proving security, we evaluate the approach analytically and experimentally and show that it significantly improves bandwidth consumption on the holder while being on par with state-of-the-art solutions with respect to the other performance metrics. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_11934 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | zkToken: Empowering Holders to Limit Revocation Checks for Verifiable Credentials Manimaran, Praveensankar Raikwar, Mayank Garrett, Thiago da Conceição, Arlindo F. Jehl, Leander Vitenberg, Roman Cryptography and Security Systems managing Verifiable Credentials are becoming increasingly popular. Unfortunately, their support for revoking previously issued credentials allows verifiers to effectively monitor the validity of the credentials, which is sensitive information. While the issue started to gain recognition, no adequate solution has been proposed so far. In this work, we propose a novel framework for time-limited continuous verification. The holder is able to individually configure the verification period when sharing information with the verifier, and the system guarantees proven untraceability of the revocation status after the verification period expires. Different from existing systems, the implementation adopts a more scalable blacklist approach where tokens corresponding to revoked credentials are stored in the registry. The approach employs ZK proofs that allow holders to prove non-membership in the blacklist. In addition to theoretically proving security, we evaluate the approach analytically and experimentally and show that it significantly improves bandwidth consumption on the holder while being on par with state-of-the-art solutions with respect to the other performance metrics. |
| title | zkToken: Empowering Holders to Limit Revocation Checks for Verifiable Credentials |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.11934 |