Between proportionnality and envy-freeness: k-proportionality
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arXiv
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866912589677592576 |
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| author | Chèze, Guillaume |
| author_facet | Chèze, Guillaume |
| contents | This article deals with the cake cutting problem. In this setting, there exists two notions of fair division: proportional division (when there are n players, each player thinks to get at least 1/n of the cake) and envy-free division (each player wants to keep his or her share because he or she does not envy the portion given to another player). Some results are valid for proportional division but not for envy-free division. Here, we introduce and study a scale between the proportional division and the envy-free division. The goal is to understand where is the gap between statements about proportional division and envy-free division. This scale comes from the notion introduced in this article: k-proportionality. When k = n this notion corresponds to the proportional division and when k = 2 it corresponds to envy-free division. With k-proportionality we can understand where some difficulties in fair division lie. First, we show that there are situations in which there is no k-proportional and equitable division of a pie with connected pieces when k $\le$ n -1. This result was known only for envy-free division, ie k = 2. Next, we prove that there are situations in which there is no Pareto-optimal k-proportional division of a cake with connected pieces when k $\le$ n -1. This result was known only for k = 2. These theorems say that we can get an impossibility result even if we do not consider an envy-free division but a weaker notion. Finally, k-proportionality allows to give a generalization with a uniform statement of theorems about strong envy-free and strong proportional divisions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_12903 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Between proportionnality and envy-freeness: k-proportionality Chèze, Guillaume Multiagent Systems Computer Science and Game Theory Combinatorics This article deals with the cake cutting problem. In this setting, there exists two notions of fair division: proportional division (when there are n players, each player thinks to get at least 1/n of the cake) and envy-free division (each player wants to keep his or her share because he or she does not envy the portion given to another player). Some results are valid for proportional division but not for envy-free division. Here, we introduce and study a scale between the proportional division and the envy-free division. The goal is to understand where is the gap between statements about proportional division and envy-free division. This scale comes from the notion introduced in this article: k-proportionality. When k = n this notion corresponds to the proportional division and when k = 2 it corresponds to envy-free division. With k-proportionality we can understand where some difficulties in fair division lie. First, we show that there are situations in which there is no k-proportional and equitable division of a pie with connected pieces when k $\le$ n -1. This result was known only for envy-free division, ie k = 2. Next, we prove that there are situations in which there is no Pareto-optimal k-proportional division of a cake with connected pieces when k $\le$ n -1. This result was known only for k = 2. These theorems say that we can get an impossibility result even if we do not consider an envy-free division but a weaker notion. Finally, k-proportionality allows to give a generalization with a uniform statement of theorems about strong envy-free and strong proportional divisions. |
| title | Between proportionnality and envy-freeness: k-proportionality |
| topic | Multiagent Systems Computer Science and Game Theory Combinatorics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.12903 |