Defining Security in Quantum Key Distribution

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Ferradini, Carla, Sandfuchs, Martin, Wolf, Ramona, Renner, Renato
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Ferradini, Carla
Sandfuchs, Martin
Wolf, Ramona
Renner, Renato
author_facet Ferradini, Carla
Sandfuchs, Martin
Wolf, Ramona
Renner, Renato
contents The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is quantified by a parameter $\varepsilon>0$, which -- under well-defined physical assumptions -- can be bounded explicitly. This contrasts with computationally secure schemes, where security claims are only asymptotic (i.e., under standard complexity assumptions, one only knows that $\varepsilon \to 0$ as the key size grows, but has no explicit bound). Here we explain the definition and interpretation of $\varepsilon$-security. Adopting an axiomatic approach, we show that $\varepsilon$ can be understood as the maximum probability of a security failure. Finally, we review and address several criticisms of this definition that have appeared in the literature.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_13405
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Defining Security in Quantum Key Distribution
Ferradini, Carla
Sandfuchs, Martin
Wolf, Ramona
Renner, Renato
Quantum Physics
Cryptography and Security
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is quantified by a parameter $\varepsilon>0$, which -- under well-defined physical assumptions -- can be bounded explicitly. This contrasts with computationally secure schemes, where security claims are only asymptotic (i.e., under standard complexity assumptions, one only knows that $\varepsilon \to 0$ as the key size grows, but has no explicit bound). Here we explain the definition and interpretation of $\varepsilon$-security. Adopting an axiomatic approach, we show that $\varepsilon$ can be understood as the maximum probability of a security failure. Finally, we review and address several criticisms of this definition that have appeared in the literature.
title Defining Security in Quantum Key Distribution
topic Quantum Physics
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.13405