Who Taught the Lie? Responsibility Attribution for Poisoned Knowledge in Retrieval-Augmented Generation
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866918163064553472 |
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| author | Zhang, Baolei Xin, Haoran Chen, Yuxi Liu, Zhuqing Yi, Biao Li, Tong Nie, Lihai Liu, Zheli Fang, Minghong |
| author_facet | Zhang, Baolei Xin, Haoran Chen, Yuxi Liu, Zhuqing Yi, Biao Li, Tong Nie, Lihai Liu, Zheli Fang, Minghong |
| contents | Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) integrates external knowledge into large language models to improve response quality. However, recent work has shown that RAG systems are highly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious texts are inserted into the knowledge database to influence model outputs. While several defenses have been proposed, they are often circumvented by more adaptive or sophisticated attacks.
This paper presents RAGOrigin, a black-box responsibility attribution framework designed to identify which texts in the knowledge database are responsible for misleading or incorrect generations. Our method constructs a focused attribution scope tailored to each misgeneration event and assigns a responsibility score to each candidate text by evaluating its retrieval ranking, semantic relevance, and influence on the generated response. The system then isolates poisoned texts using an unsupervised clustering method. We evaluate RAGOrigin across seven datasets and fifteen poisoning attacks, including newly developed adaptive poisoning strategies and multi-attacker scenarios. Our approach outperforms existing baselines in identifying poisoned content and remains robust under dynamic and noisy conditions. These results suggest that RAGOrigin provides a practical and effective solution for tracing the origins of corrupted knowledge in RAG systems. Our code is available at: https://github.com/zhangbl6618/RAG-Responsibility-Attribution |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_13772 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Who Taught the Lie? Responsibility Attribution for Poisoned Knowledge in Retrieval-Augmented Generation Zhang, Baolei Xin, Haoran Chen, Yuxi Liu, Zhuqing Yi, Biao Li, Tong Nie, Lihai Liu, Zheli Fang, Minghong Cryptography and Security Information Retrieval Machine Learning Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) integrates external knowledge into large language models to improve response quality. However, recent work has shown that RAG systems are highly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious texts are inserted into the knowledge database to influence model outputs. While several defenses have been proposed, they are often circumvented by more adaptive or sophisticated attacks. This paper presents RAGOrigin, a black-box responsibility attribution framework designed to identify which texts in the knowledge database are responsible for misleading or incorrect generations. Our method constructs a focused attribution scope tailored to each misgeneration event and assigns a responsibility score to each candidate text by evaluating its retrieval ranking, semantic relevance, and influence on the generated response. The system then isolates poisoned texts using an unsupervised clustering method. We evaluate RAGOrigin across seven datasets and fifteen poisoning attacks, including newly developed adaptive poisoning strategies and multi-attacker scenarios. Our approach outperforms existing baselines in identifying poisoned content and remains robust under dynamic and noisy conditions. These results suggest that RAGOrigin provides a practical and effective solution for tracing the origins of corrupted knowledge in RAG systems. Our code is available at: https://github.com/zhangbl6618/RAG-Responsibility-Attribution |
| title | Who Taught the Lie? Responsibility Attribution for Poisoned Knowledge in Retrieval-Augmented Generation |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Information Retrieval Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.13772 |