How Bad Is Forming Your Own Multidimensional Opinion?
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866911160727502848 |
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| author | Banihashem, Kiarash Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi JafariRaviz, Mahdi Mittal, Danny Montaseri, Alipasha |
| author_facet | Banihashem, Kiarash Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi JafariRaviz, Mahdi Mittal, Danny Montaseri, Alipasha |
| contents | Understanding the formation of opinions on interconnected topics within social networks is of significant importance. It offers insights into collective behavior and decision-making, with applications in Graph Neural Networks. Existing models propose that individuals form opinions based on a weighted average of their peers' opinions and their own beliefs. This averaging process, viewed as a best-response game, can be seen as an individual minimizing disagreements with peers, defined by a quadratic penalty, leading to an equilibrium. Bindel, Kleinberg, and Oren (FOCS 2011) provided tight bounds on the "price of anarchy" defined as the maximum overall disagreement at equilibrium relative to a social optimum. Bhawalkar, Gollapudi, and Munagala (STOC 2013) generalized the penalty function to non-quadratic penalties and provided tight bounds on the price of anarchy.
When considering multiple topics, an individual's opinions can be represented as a vector. Parsegov, Proskurnikov, Tempo, and Friedkin (2016) proposed a multidimensional model using the weighted averaging process, but with constant interdependencies between topics. However, the question of the price of anarchy for this model remained open. We address this by providing tight bounds on the multidimensional model, while also generalizing it to more complex interdependencies. Following the work of Bhawalkar, Gollapudi, and Munagala, we provide tight bounds on the price of anarchy under non-quadratic penalties. Surprisingly, these bounds match the scalar model. We further demonstrate that the bounds remain unchanged even when adding another layer of complexity, involving groups of individuals minimizing their overall internal and external disagreement penalty, a common occurrence in real-life scenarios. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_14411 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | How Bad Is Forming Your Own Multidimensional Opinion? Banihashem, Kiarash Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi JafariRaviz, Mahdi Mittal, Danny Montaseri, Alipasha Computer Science and Game Theory Understanding the formation of opinions on interconnected topics within social networks is of significant importance. It offers insights into collective behavior and decision-making, with applications in Graph Neural Networks. Existing models propose that individuals form opinions based on a weighted average of their peers' opinions and their own beliefs. This averaging process, viewed as a best-response game, can be seen as an individual minimizing disagreements with peers, defined by a quadratic penalty, leading to an equilibrium. Bindel, Kleinberg, and Oren (FOCS 2011) provided tight bounds on the "price of anarchy" defined as the maximum overall disagreement at equilibrium relative to a social optimum. Bhawalkar, Gollapudi, and Munagala (STOC 2013) generalized the penalty function to non-quadratic penalties and provided tight bounds on the price of anarchy. When considering multiple topics, an individual's opinions can be represented as a vector. Parsegov, Proskurnikov, Tempo, and Friedkin (2016) proposed a multidimensional model using the weighted averaging process, but with constant interdependencies between topics. However, the question of the price of anarchy for this model remained open. We address this by providing tight bounds on the multidimensional model, while also generalizing it to more complex interdependencies. Following the work of Bhawalkar, Gollapudi, and Munagala, we provide tight bounds on the price of anarchy under non-quadratic penalties. Surprisingly, these bounds match the scalar model. We further demonstrate that the bounds remain unchanged even when adding another layer of complexity, involving groups of individuals minimizing their overall internal and external disagreement penalty, a common occurrence in real-life scenarios. |
| title | How Bad Is Forming Your Own Multidimensional Opinion? |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.14411 |