How Exclusive are Ethereum Transactions? Evidence from non-winning blocks
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866914158202585088 |
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| author | Pahari, Vabuk Canidio, Andrea |
| author_facet | Pahari, Vabuk Canidio, Andrea |
| contents | We analyze 15,097 blocks proposed for inclusion in Ethereum's blockchain over an eight-minute window on December 3, 2024, during which 38 blocks were added to the chain. We classify transactions as exclusive -- appearing only in blocks from a single builder -- or private -- absent from the public mempool but included in blocks from multiple builders. We find that, depending on the methodology, exclusive transactions account for between 77.2% and 84% of the total fees paid by transactions in winning blocks. Moreover, we show that exclusivity cannot be fully attributed to persistent relationships between senders and builders: only between 7% and 8.4% of all on-chain exclusive transaction value originates from senders who route exclusively to one builder. Finally, we observe that transaction exclusivity is dynamic. Some transactions are exclusive at the start of a bidding cycle but later appear in blocks from multiple builders. Other transactions remain exclusive to a losing builder for two or three cycles before appearing in the public mempool. These transactions are therefore delayed and then exposed to potential attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_16052 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | How Exclusive are Ethereum Transactions? Evidence from non-winning blocks Pahari, Vabuk Canidio, Andrea Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing General Economics Economics We analyze 15,097 blocks proposed for inclusion in Ethereum's blockchain over an eight-minute window on December 3, 2024, during which 38 blocks were added to the chain. We classify transactions as exclusive -- appearing only in blocks from a single builder -- or private -- absent from the public mempool but included in blocks from multiple builders. We find that, depending on the methodology, exclusive transactions account for between 77.2% and 84% of the total fees paid by transactions in winning blocks. Moreover, we show that exclusivity cannot be fully attributed to persistent relationships between senders and builders: only between 7% and 8.4% of all on-chain exclusive transaction value originates from senders who route exclusively to one builder. Finally, we observe that transaction exclusivity is dynamic. Some transactions are exclusive at the start of a bidding cycle but later appear in blocks from multiple builders. Other transactions remain exclusive to a losing builder for two or three cycles before appearing in the public mempool. These transactions are therefore delayed and then exposed to potential attacks. |
| title | How Exclusive are Ethereum Transactions? Evidence from non-winning blocks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.16052 |