On Sybil-proofness in Restaking Networks
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866918145832255488 |
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| author | Chitra, Tarun Penna, Paolo Schneider, Manvir |
| author_facet | Chitra, Tarun Penna, Paolo Schneider, Manvir |
| contents | Restaking protocols expand validator responsibilities beyond consensus, but their security depends on resistance to Sybil attacks. We introduce a formal framework for Sybil-proofness in restaking networks, distinguishing between two types of attacks, one in which other Sybil identities are kept out of an attack and one where multiple Sybil identities attack. We analyze marginal and multiplicative slashing mechanisms and characterize the conditions under which each deters Sybil strategies. We then prove an impossibility theorem: no slashing mechanism can simultaneously prevent both attack types. Finally, we study the impact of network structure through random graph models: while Erdös-Rényi networks remain Sybil-proof, even minimal heterogeneity in a two-block stochastic block model makes Sybil attacks profitable. These results reveal fundamental limits of mechanism design for restaking and highlight the critical role of network topology. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_18338 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On Sybil-proofness in Restaking Networks Chitra, Tarun Penna, Paolo Schneider, Manvir Computer Science and Game Theory Cryptography and Security Restaking protocols expand validator responsibilities beyond consensus, but their security depends on resistance to Sybil attacks. We introduce a formal framework for Sybil-proofness in restaking networks, distinguishing between two types of attacks, one in which other Sybil identities are kept out of an attack and one where multiple Sybil identities attack. We analyze marginal and multiplicative slashing mechanisms and characterize the conditions under which each deters Sybil strategies. We then prove an impossibility theorem: no slashing mechanism can simultaneously prevent both attack types. Finally, we study the impact of network structure through random graph models: while Erdös-Rényi networks remain Sybil-proof, even minimal heterogeneity in a two-block stochastic block model makes Sybil attacks profitable. These results reveal fundamental limits of mechanism design for restaking and highlight the critical role of network topology. |
| title | On Sybil-proofness in Restaking Networks |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.18338 |