VoxGuard: Evaluating User and Attribute Privacy in Speech via Membership Inference Attacks
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866918304360169472 |
|---|---|
| author | Tsaprazlis, Efthymios Lertpetchpun, Thanathai Feng, Tiantian Karimireddy, Sai Praneeth Narayanan, Shrikanth |
| author_facet | Tsaprazlis, Efthymios Lertpetchpun, Thanathai Feng, Tiantian Karimireddy, Sai Praneeth Narayanan, Shrikanth |
| contents | Voice anonymization aims to conceal speaker identity and attributes while preserving intelligibility, but current evaluations rely almost exclusively on Equal Error Rate (EER) that obscures whether adversaries can mount high-precision attacks. We argue that privacy should instead be evaluated in the low false-positive rate (FPR) regime, where even a small number of successful identifications constitutes a meaningful breach. To this end, we introduce VoxGuard, a framework grounded in differential privacy and membership inference that formalizes two complementary notions: User Privacy, preventing speaker re-identification, and Attribute Privacy, protecting sensitive traits such as gender and accent. Across synthetic and real datasets, we find that informed adversaries, especially those using fine-tuned models and max-similarity scoring, achieve orders-of-magnitude stronger attacks at low-FPR despite similar EER. For attributes, we show that simple transparent attacks recover gender and accent with near-perfect accuracy even after anonymization. Our results demonstrate that EER substantially underestimates leakage, highlighting the need for low-FPR evaluation, and recommend VoxGuard as a benchmark for evaluating privacy leakage. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_18413 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | VoxGuard: Evaluating User and Attribute Privacy in Speech via Membership Inference Attacks Tsaprazlis, Efthymios Lertpetchpun, Thanathai Feng, Tiantian Karimireddy, Sai Praneeth Narayanan, Shrikanth Cryptography and Security Machine Learning Voice anonymization aims to conceal speaker identity and attributes while preserving intelligibility, but current evaluations rely almost exclusively on Equal Error Rate (EER) that obscures whether adversaries can mount high-precision attacks. We argue that privacy should instead be evaluated in the low false-positive rate (FPR) regime, where even a small number of successful identifications constitutes a meaningful breach. To this end, we introduce VoxGuard, a framework grounded in differential privacy and membership inference that formalizes two complementary notions: User Privacy, preventing speaker re-identification, and Attribute Privacy, protecting sensitive traits such as gender and accent. Across synthetic and real datasets, we find that informed adversaries, especially those using fine-tuned models and max-similarity scoring, achieve orders-of-magnitude stronger attacks at low-FPR despite similar EER. For attributes, we show that simple transparent attacks recover gender and accent with near-perfect accuracy even after anonymization. Our results demonstrate that EER substantially underestimates leakage, highlighting the need for low-FPR evaluation, and recommend VoxGuard as a benchmark for evaluating privacy leakage. |
| title | VoxGuard: Evaluating User and Attribute Privacy in Speech via Membership Inference Attacks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.18413 |