Identification and Estimation of Seller Risk Aversion in Ascending Auctions

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Gimenes, Nathalie, Qi, Tonghui, Srisuma, Sorawoot
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Gimenes, Nathalie
Qi, Tonghui
Srisuma, Sorawoot
author_facet Gimenes, Nathalie
Qi, Tonghui
Srisuma, Sorawoot
contents This paper shows how to identify and estimate the seller's risk parameter in an ascending auction. We consider a semiparametric model where the seller has a parametric utility function (such as CARA or CRRA) and the distribution of bidder valuations is modeled flexibly. We provide primitive conditions under which the risk parameter is identified and show that it can be consistently estimated with an asymptotically normal limiting distribution under standard regularity conditions. A Monte Carlo study demonstrates good finite-sample performance of the proposed estimator. We apply our approach to foreclosure real estate auction data from São Paulo. We find evidence that sellers are risk-averse, which leads to a much better fit to the data than a model with risk-neutral sellers, which would substantially underpredict the reserve price relative to what is observed.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_19945
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Identification and Estimation of Seller Risk Aversion in Ascending Auctions
Gimenes, Nathalie
Qi, Tonghui
Srisuma, Sorawoot
Econometrics
This paper shows how to identify and estimate the seller's risk parameter in an ascending auction. We consider a semiparametric model where the seller has a parametric utility function (such as CARA or CRRA) and the distribution of bidder valuations is modeled flexibly. We provide primitive conditions under which the risk parameter is identified and show that it can be consistently estimated with an asymptotically normal limiting distribution under standard regularity conditions. A Monte Carlo study demonstrates good finite-sample performance of the proposed estimator. We apply our approach to foreclosure real estate auction data from São Paulo. We find evidence that sellers are risk-averse, which leads to a much better fit to the data than a model with risk-neutral sellers, which would substantially underpredict the reserve price relative to what is observed.
title Identification and Estimation of Seller Risk Aversion in Ascending Auctions
topic Econometrics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.19945