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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.20329 |
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| _version_ | 1866918147340107776 |
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| author | Gould, Brendan Vamvoudakis, Kyriakos |
| author_facet | Gould, Brendan Vamvoudakis, Kyriakos |
| contents | In this paper, we present a novel, game-theoretic model of deception in two-player, zero-sum games. Our framework leverages an information asymmetry: one player (the deceiver) has access to accurate payoff information, while the other (the victim) observes a modified version of these payoffs due to the deception strategy employed. The deceiver's objective is to choose a deception-action pair that optimally exploits the victim's best response to the altered payoffs, subject to a constraint on the deception's magnitude. We characterize the optimal deceptive strategy as the solution to a bi-level optimization problem, and we provide both an exact solution and an efficient method for computing a high-quality feasible point. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on numerical examples inspired by honeypot deception. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_20329 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Novel Framework for Honey-X Deception in Zero-Sum Games Gould, Brendan Vamvoudakis, Kyriakos Computer Science and Game Theory In this paper, we present a novel, game-theoretic model of deception in two-player, zero-sum games. Our framework leverages an information asymmetry: one player (the deceiver) has access to accurate payoff information, while the other (the victim) observes a modified version of these payoffs due to the deception strategy employed. The deceiver's objective is to choose a deception-action pair that optimally exploits the victim's best response to the altered payoffs, subject to a constraint on the deception's magnitude. We characterize the optimal deceptive strategy as the solution to a bi-level optimization problem, and we provide both an exact solution and an efficient method for computing a high-quality feasible point. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on numerical examples inspired by honeypot deception. |
| title | A Novel Framework for Honey-X Deception in Zero-Sum Games |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.20329 |