RLCracker: Evaluating the Worst-Case Vulnerability of LLM Watermarks with Adaptive RL Attacks
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866917492559970304 |
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| author | Huang, Hanbo Zhang, Yiran Zheng, Hao Gong, Xuan Li, Yihan Liu, Lin Liu, Zhuotao Liang, Shiyu |
| author_facet | Huang, Hanbo Zhang, Yiran Zheng, Hao Gong, Xuan Li, Yihan Liu, Lin Liu, Zhuotao Liang, Shiyu |
| contents | Large language model (LLM) watermarking has shown promise in detecting AI-generated content and mitigating misuse, with prior work claiming robustness against paraphrasing and text editing. In this paper, we argue that existing evaluations are not sufficiently adversarial, obscuring critical vulnerabilities and overstating the security. To address this, we introduce the adaptive robustness radius, a formal metric that quantifies the worst-case resilience of watermarks against adaptive adversaries. By lifting the paraphrase space into a KL-divergence ball, we approximate this radius and theoretically demonstrate that optimizing the attack context and model parameters can significantly reduce the approximate radius, making watermarks highly vulnerable to paraphrase attacks. Leveraging this insight, we propose RLCracker, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based adaptive attack that erases watermark signals with limited watermarked examples and limited access to the detector. Despite weak supervision, it empowers a 3B model to achieve 98.5% removal success with minimal semantic shift on 1,500-token Unigram-marked texts after training on only 100 short samples. This performance dramatically exceeds 6.75% by GPT-4o and generalizes across five model sizes over ten watermarking schemes. Our code is available at https://github.com/OTT0-OTO/RLCracker. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_20924 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | RLCracker: Evaluating the Worst-Case Vulnerability of LLM Watermarks with Adaptive RL Attacks Huang, Hanbo Zhang, Yiran Zheng, Hao Gong, Xuan Li, Yihan Liu, Lin Liu, Zhuotao Liang, Shiyu Cryptography and Security Large language model (LLM) watermarking has shown promise in detecting AI-generated content and mitigating misuse, with prior work claiming robustness against paraphrasing and text editing. In this paper, we argue that existing evaluations are not sufficiently adversarial, obscuring critical vulnerabilities and overstating the security. To address this, we introduce the adaptive robustness radius, a formal metric that quantifies the worst-case resilience of watermarks against adaptive adversaries. By lifting the paraphrase space into a KL-divergence ball, we approximate this radius and theoretically demonstrate that optimizing the attack context and model parameters can significantly reduce the approximate radius, making watermarks highly vulnerable to paraphrase attacks. Leveraging this insight, we propose RLCracker, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based adaptive attack that erases watermark signals with limited watermarked examples and limited access to the detector. Despite weak supervision, it empowers a 3B model to achieve 98.5% removal success with minimal semantic shift on 1,500-token Unigram-marked texts after training on only 100 short samples. This performance dramatically exceeds 6.75% by GPT-4o and generalizes across five model sizes over ten watermarking schemes. Our code is available at https://github.com/OTT0-OTO/RLCracker. |
| title | RLCracker: Evaluating the Worst-Case Vulnerability of LLM Watermarks with Adaptive RL Attacks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.20924 |