A Category Theoretic Approach to Approximate Game Theory

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Author: Ghani, Neil
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Ghani, Neil
author_facet Ghani, Neil
contents This paper uses category theory to develop an entirely new approach to approximate game theory. Game theory is the study of how different agents within a multi-agent system take decisions. At its core, game theory asks what an optimal decision is in a given scenario. Thus approximate game theory asks what is an approximately optimal decision in a given scenario. This is important in practice as -- just like in much of computing -- exact answers maybe too difficult to compute or even impossible to compute given inherent uncertainty in input. We consider first "Selection Functions" which are functions and develop a simple yet robust model of approximate equilibria. We develop the algebraic properties of approximation wrt selection functions and also relate approximation to the compositional structure of selection functions. We then repeat this process successfully for Open Games -- a more advanced model of game theory.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_20932
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle A Category Theoretic Approach to Approximate Game Theory
Ghani, Neil
Computer Science and Game Theory
Logic in Computer Science
Multiagent Systems
Symbolic Computation
This paper uses category theory to develop an entirely new approach to approximate game theory. Game theory is the study of how different agents within a multi-agent system take decisions. At its core, game theory asks what an optimal decision is in a given scenario. Thus approximate game theory asks what is an approximately optimal decision in a given scenario. This is important in practice as -- just like in much of computing -- exact answers maybe too difficult to compute or even impossible to compute given inherent uncertainty in input. We consider first "Selection Functions" which are functions and develop a simple yet robust model of approximate equilibria. We develop the algebraic properties of approximation wrt selection functions and also relate approximation to the compositional structure of selection functions. We then repeat this process successfully for Open Games -- a more advanced model of game theory.
title A Category Theoretic Approach to Approximate Game Theory
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Logic in Computer Science
Multiagent Systems
Symbolic Computation
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.20932