FORCE: Transferable Visual Jailbreaking Attacks via Feature Over-Reliance CorrEction

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Lin, Runqi, Paren, Alasdair, Yuan, Suqin, Li, Muyang, Torr, Philip, Bibi, Adel, Liu, Tongliang
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Lin, Runqi
Paren, Alasdair
Yuan, Suqin
Li, Muyang
Torr, Philip
Bibi, Adel
Liu, Tongliang
author_facet Lin, Runqi
Paren, Alasdair
Yuan, Suqin
Li, Muyang
Torr, Philip
Bibi, Adel
Liu, Tongliang
contents The integration of new modalities enhances the capabilities of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) but also introduces additional vulnerabilities. In particular, simple visual jailbreaking attacks can manipulate open-source MLLMs more readily than sophisticated textual attacks. However, these underdeveloped attacks exhibit extremely limited cross-model transferability, failing to reliably identify vulnerabilities in closed-source MLLMs. In this work, we analyse the loss landscape of these jailbreaking attacks and find that the generated attacks tend to reside in high-sharpness regions, whose effectiveness is highly sensitive to even minor parameter changes during transfer. To further explain the high-sharpness localisations, we analyse their feature representations in both the intermediate layers and the spectral domain, revealing an improper reliance on narrow layer representations and semantically poor frequency components. Building on this, we propose a Feature Over-Reliance CorrEction (FORCE) method, which guides the attack to explore broader feasible regions across layer features and rescales the influence of frequency features according to their semantic content. By eliminating non-generalizable reliance on both layer and spectral features, our method discovers flattened feasible regions for visual jailbreaking attacks, thereby improving cross-model transferability. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach effectively facilitates visual red-teaming evaluations against closed-source MLLMs.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_21029
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle FORCE: Transferable Visual Jailbreaking Attacks via Feature Over-Reliance CorrEction
Lin, Runqi
Paren, Alasdair
Yuan, Suqin
Li, Muyang
Torr, Philip
Bibi, Adel
Liu, Tongliang
Machine Learning
The integration of new modalities enhances the capabilities of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) but also introduces additional vulnerabilities. In particular, simple visual jailbreaking attacks can manipulate open-source MLLMs more readily than sophisticated textual attacks. However, these underdeveloped attacks exhibit extremely limited cross-model transferability, failing to reliably identify vulnerabilities in closed-source MLLMs. In this work, we analyse the loss landscape of these jailbreaking attacks and find that the generated attacks tend to reside in high-sharpness regions, whose effectiveness is highly sensitive to even minor parameter changes during transfer. To further explain the high-sharpness localisations, we analyse their feature representations in both the intermediate layers and the spectral domain, revealing an improper reliance on narrow layer representations and semantically poor frequency components. Building on this, we propose a Feature Over-Reliance CorrEction (FORCE) method, which guides the attack to explore broader feasible regions across layer features and rescales the influence of frequency features according to their semantic content. By eliminating non-generalizable reliance on both layer and spectral features, our method discovers flattened feasible regions for visual jailbreaking attacks, thereby improving cross-model transferability. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach effectively facilitates visual red-teaming evaluations against closed-source MLLMs.
title FORCE: Transferable Visual Jailbreaking Attacks via Feature Over-Reliance CorrEction
topic Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.21029