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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.22662 |
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| _version_ | 1866916972790284288 |
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| author | Durieux, Mathilde Taylor, Kayla D. Kandel, Laxima Niure Gupta, Deepti |
| author_facet | Durieux, Mathilde Taylor, Kayla D. Kandel, Laxima Niure Gupta, Deepti |
| contents | Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing involves transmitting fake signals that mimic those from GPS satellites, causing the GPS receivers to calculate incorrect Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) information. Recently, there has been a surge in GPS spoofing attacks targeting aircraft. Since GPS satellite signals are weak, the spoofed high-power signal can easily overpower them. These spoofed signals are often interpreted as valid by the GPS receiver, which can cause severe and cascading effects on air navigation. While much of the existing research on GPS spoofing focuses on technical aspects of detection and mitigation, human factors are often neglected, even though pilots are an integral part of aircraft operation and potentially vulnerable to deception. This research addresses this gap by conducting a detailed analysis of the behavior of student pilots when subjected to GPS spoofing using the Force Dynamics 401CR flight simulator with X-Plane 11 and a Cessna 172 equipped with Garmin G1000. Spoofing scenarios were implemented via custom scripts that altered navigational data without modifying the external visual environment. Thirty student pilots from the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Daytona Beach campus with diverse flying experience levels were recruited to participate in three spoofing scenarios. A pre-simulation questionnaire was distributed to measure pilot experience and confidence in GPS.Inflight decision-making during the spoofing attacks was observed, including reaction time to anomalies, visual attention to interface elements, and cognitive biases. A post-flight evaluation of workload was obtained using a modified NASA Task Load Index (TLX) method. This study provides a first step toward identifying human vulnerabilities to GPS spoofing amid the ongoing debate over GPS reliance. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_22662 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | GPS Spoofing Attacks and Pilot Responses Using a Flight Simulator Environment Durieux, Mathilde Taylor, Kayla D. Kandel, Laxima Niure Gupta, Deepti Cryptography and Security Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing involves transmitting fake signals that mimic those from GPS satellites, causing the GPS receivers to calculate incorrect Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) information. Recently, there has been a surge in GPS spoofing attacks targeting aircraft. Since GPS satellite signals are weak, the spoofed high-power signal can easily overpower them. These spoofed signals are often interpreted as valid by the GPS receiver, which can cause severe and cascading effects on air navigation. While much of the existing research on GPS spoofing focuses on technical aspects of detection and mitigation, human factors are often neglected, even though pilots are an integral part of aircraft operation and potentially vulnerable to deception. This research addresses this gap by conducting a detailed analysis of the behavior of student pilots when subjected to GPS spoofing using the Force Dynamics 401CR flight simulator with X-Plane 11 and a Cessna 172 equipped with Garmin G1000. Spoofing scenarios were implemented via custom scripts that altered navigational data without modifying the external visual environment. Thirty student pilots from the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Daytona Beach campus with diverse flying experience levels were recruited to participate in three spoofing scenarios. A pre-simulation questionnaire was distributed to measure pilot experience and confidence in GPS.Inflight decision-making during the spoofing attacks was observed, including reaction time to anomalies, visual attention to interface elements, and cognitive biases. A post-flight evaluation of workload was obtained using a modified NASA Task Load Index (TLX) method. This study provides a first step toward identifying human vulnerabilities to GPS spoofing amid the ongoing debate over GPS reliance. |
| title | GPS Spoofing Attacks and Pilot Responses Using a Flight Simulator Environment |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.22662 |