Towards Strategic Persuasion with Language Models

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Cheng, Zirui, You, Jiaxuan
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Cheng, Zirui
You, Jiaxuan
author_facet Cheng, Zirui
You, Jiaxuan
contents Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong persuasive capabilities comparable to those of humans, offering promising benefits while raising societal concerns. However, systematically evaluating the persuasive capabilities of LLMs is inherently challenging, as the effectiveness of persuasion among humans varies significantly across different domains. In this paper, we take a theory-driven approach to provide a scalable and principled framework for studying the persuasive capabilities of LLMs. Grounded in Bayesian persuasion theory, we repurpose human-human persuasion datasets to construct environments for evaluating and training LLMs as strategic persuaders. Our results reveal that frontier models can consistently achieve high persuasion gains and exhibit sophisticated persuasion strategies that align with theoretical characterizations. Building on this, we use reinforcement learning to train LLMs for strategic persuasion in our environments. Our results also demonstrate that even small LLMs can obtain significantly higher persuasion gains through reinforcement learning.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_22989
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Towards Strategic Persuasion with Language Models
Cheng, Zirui
You, Jiaxuan
Artificial Intelligence
Computers and Society
Computer Science and Game Theory
Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong persuasive capabilities comparable to those of humans, offering promising benefits while raising societal concerns. However, systematically evaluating the persuasive capabilities of LLMs is inherently challenging, as the effectiveness of persuasion among humans varies significantly across different domains. In this paper, we take a theory-driven approach to provide a scalable and principled framework for studying the persuasive capabilities of LLMs. Grounded in Bayesian persuasion theory, we repurpose human-human persuasion datasets to construct environments for evaluating and training LLMs as strategic persuaders. Our results reveal that frontier models can consistently achieve high persuasion gains and exhibit sophisticated persuasion strategies that align with theoretical characterizations. Building on this, we use reinforcement learning to train LLMs for strategic persuasion in our environments. Our results also demonstrate that even small LLMs can obtain significantly higher persuasion gains through reinforcement learning.
title Towards Strategic Persuasion with Language Models
topic Artificial Intelligence
Computers and Society
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.22989