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Two-Sided Fairness in Many-to-One Matching

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Igarashi, Ayumi, Kamiyama, Naoyuki, Kawase, Yasushi, Suksompong, Warut, Sumita, Hanna, Yokoi, Yu
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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