Signaling in the Age of AI: Evidence from Cover Letters

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Cui, Jingyi, Dias, Gabriel, Ye, Justin
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Cui, Jingyi
Dias, Gabriel
Ye, Justin
author_facet Cui, Jingyi
Dias, Gabriel
Ye, Justin
contents We study the impact of generative AI on labor market signaling using the introduction of an AI-powered cover letter writing tool on a large online labor platform. Our data track both access to the tool and usage at the application level. Difference-in-differences estimates show that access to the tool increased textual alignment between cover letters and job posts and raised callback rates. Time spent editing AI-generated cover letter drafts is positively correlated with hiring success. After the tool's introduction, the correlation between cover letters' textual alignment and callbacks fell by 51%, consistent with what theory predicts if the AI technology reduces the signal content of cover letters. In response, employers shifted toward alternative signals, including workers' prior work histories.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_25054
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Signaling in the Age of AI: Evidence from Cover Letters
Cui, Jingyi
Dias, Gabriel
Ye, Justin
General Economics
Economics
We study the impact of generative AI on labor market signaling using the introduction of an AI-powered cover letter writing tool on a large online labor platform. Our data track both access to the tool and usage at the application level. Difference-in-differences estimates show that access to the tool increased textual alignment between cover letters and job posts and raised callback rates. Time spent editing AI-generated cover letter drafts is positively correlated with hiring success. After the tool's introduction, the correlation between cover letters' textual alignment and callbacks fell by 51%, consistent with what theory predicts if the AI technology reduces the signal content of cover letters. In response, employers shifted toward alternative signals, including workers' prior work histories.
title Signaling in the Age of AI: Evidence from Cover Letters
topic General Economics
Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.25054