Exact Bias of Linear TRNG Correctors -- Spectral Approach
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| author | Skorski, Maciej Soto, Francisco-Javier Günlü, Onur |
| author_facet | Skorski, Maciej Soto, Francisco-Javier Günlü, Onur |
| contents | Using Fourier analysis, this paper establishes near-optimal security bounds for linear correctors commonly used in True Random Number Generators (TRNGs), expressed through code weight enumerators and input bias parameters. We provide the first near-tight bias characterization in total variation, by interpolating between optimal $\ell_\infty$ and $\ell_2$ norm results. Our bounds improve security assessments by an order of magnitude over previously known (overly conservative) estimates. Across $\sim $20,000 codes, we examine fundamental trade-offs between compression efficiency, cryptographic security, and hardware complexity. Achieving 80-bit security with 10\% input bias typically requires sacrificing more than 50\% of the code rate and incurs increased hardware cost. This quantifies the inherent cost of randomness extraction in hardware TRNG implementations. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2509_26393 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Exact Bias of Linear TRNG Correctors -- Spectral Approach Skorski, Maciej Soto, Francisco-Javier Günlü, Onur Cryptography and Security Information Theory 94A60, 94B05, 42B05, 60G50 E.3; G.2.1; B.2.4 Using Fourier analysis, this paper establishes near-optimal security bounds for linear correctors commonly used in True Random Number Generators (TRNGs), expressed through code weight enumerators and input bias parameters. We provide the first near-tight bias characterization in total variation, by interpolating between optimal $\ell_\infty$ and $\ell_2$ norm results. Our bounds improve security assessments by an order of magnitude over previously known (overly conservative) estimates. Across $\sim $20,000 codes, we examine fundamental trade-offs between compression efficiency, cryptographic security, and hardware complexity. Achieving 80-bit security with 10\% input bias typically requires sacrificing more than 50\% of the code rate and incurs increased hardware cost. This quantifies the inherent cost of randomness extraction in hardware TRNG implementations. |
| title | Exact Bias of Linear TRNG Correctors -- Spectral Approach |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Information Theory 94A60, 94B05, 42B05, 60G50 E.3; G.2.1; B.2.4 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.26393 |