Conceptualizing and Modeling Communication-Based Cyberattacks on Automated Vehicles
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866909821604724736 |
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| author | Li, Tianyi Liu, Tianyu Yang, Yicheng |
| author_facet | Li, Tianyi Liu, Tianyu Yang, Yicheng |
| contents | Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) is rapidly proliferating across electric vehicles (EVs) and internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, enhancing traffic flow while simultaneously expanding the attack surface for communication-based cyberattacks. Because the two powertrains translate control inputs into motion differently, their cyber-resilience remains unquantified. Therefore, we formalize six novel message-level attack vectors and implement them in a ring-road simulation that systematically varies the ACC market penetration rates (MPRs) and the spatial pattern of compromised vehicles. A three-tier risk taxonomy converts disturbance metrics into actionable defense priorities for practitioners. Across all simulation scenarios, EV platoons exhibit lower velocity standard deviation, reduced spacing oscillations, and faster post-attack recovery compared to ICE counterparts, revealing an inherent stability advantage. These findings clarify how controller-to-powertrain coupling influences vulnerability and offer quantitative guidance for the detection and mitigation of attacks in mixed automated traffic. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_02364 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Conceptualizing and Modeling Communication-Based Cyberattacks on Automated Vehicles Li, Tianyi Liu, Tianyu Yang, Yicheng Systems and Control Robotics Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) is rapidly proliferating across electric vehicles (EVs) and internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, enhancing traffic flow while simultaneously expanding the attack surface for communication-based cyberattacks. Because the two powertrains translate control inputs into motion differently, their cyber-resilience remains unquantified. Therefore, we formalize six novel message-level attack vectors and implement them in a ring-road simulation that systematically varies the ACC market penetration rates (MPRs) and the spatial pattern of compromised vehicles. A three-tier risk taxonomy converts disturbance metrics into actionable defense priorities for practitioners. Across all simulation scenarios, EV platoons exhibit lower velocity standard deviation, reduced spacing oscillations, and faster post-attack recovery compared to ICE counterparts, revealing an inherent stability advantage. These findings clarify how controller-to-powertrain coupling influences vulnerability and offer quantitative guidance for the detection and mitigation of attacks in mixed automated traffic. |
| title | Conceptualizing and Modeling Communication-Based Cyberattacks on Automated Vehicles |
| topic | Systems and Control Robotics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.02364 |