Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.02737 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866917428624097280 |
|---|---|
| author | Corblet, Pauline Fox, Jeremy Galichon, Alfred |
| author_facet | Corblet, Pauline Fox, Jeremy Galichon, Alfred |
| contents | We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with market-clearing prices takes place. We prove the existence of an equilibrium with time-varying distributions of agent types and show it is the solution to a social planner's problem. We also prove that a stationary equilibrium exists. We introduce econometric shocks to account for unobserved heterogeneity in match formation. We propose two algorithms to compute a stationary equilibrium. We adapt both algorithms for estimation. We estimate a model of accumulation of job-specific human capital using data on Swedish engineers. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_02737 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Repeated Matching Games: An Empirical Framework Corblet, Pauline Fox, Jeremy Galichon, Alfred Econometrics We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with market-clearing prices takes place. We prove the existence of an equilibrium with time-varying distributions of agent types and show it is the solution to a social planner's problem. We also prove that a stationary equilibrium exists. We introduce econometric shocks to account for unobserved heterogeneity in match formation. We propose two algorithms to compute a stationary equilibrium. We adapt both algorithms for estimation. We estimate a model of accumulation of job-specific human capital using data on Swedish engineers. |
| title | Repeated Matching Games: An Empirical Framework |
| topic | Econometrics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.02737 |