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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.03720 |
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| _version_ | 1866909825338703872 |
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| author | Zhan, Dongyang Yu, Zhaofeng Yu, Xiangzhan Zhang, Hongli Ye, Lin |
| author_facet | Zhan, Dongyang Yu, Zhaofeng Yu, Xiangzhan Zhang, Hongli Ye, Lin |
| contents | Linux Seccomp is widely used by the program developers and the system maintainers to secure the operating systems, which can block unused syscalls for different applications and containers to shrink the attack surface of the operating systems. However, it is difficult to configure the whitelist of a container or application without the help of program developers. Docker containers block about only 50 syscalls by default, and lots of unblocked useless syscalls introduce a big kernel attack surface. To obtain the dependent syscalls, dynamic tracking is a straight-forward approach but it cannot get the full syscall list. Static analysis can construct an over-approximated syscall list, but the list contains many false positives. In this paper, a systematic dependent syscall analysis approach, sysverify, is proposed by combining static analysis and dynamic verification together to shrink the kernel attack surface. The semantic gap between the binary executables and syscalls is bridged by analyzing the binary and the source code, which builds the mapping between the library APIs and syscalls systematically. To further reduce the attack surface at best effort, we propose a dynamic verification approach to intercept and analyze the security of the invocations of indirect-call-related or rarely invoked syscalls with low overhead. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_03720 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Shrinking the Kernel Attack Surface Through Static and Dynamic Syscall Limitation Zhan, Dongyang Yu, Zhaofeng Yu, Xiangzhan Zhang, Hongli Ye, Lin Cryptography and Security Linux Seccomp is widely used by the program developers and the system maintainers to secure the operating systems, which can block unused syscalls for different applications and containers to shrink the attack surface of the operating systems. However, it is difficult to configure the whitelist of a container or application without the help of program developers. Docker containers block about only 50 syscalls by default, and lots of unblocked useless syscalls introduce a big kernel attack surface. To obtain the dependent syscalls, dynamic tracking is a straight-forward approach but it cannot get the full syscall list. Static analysis can construct an over-approximated syscall list, but the list contains many false positives. In this paper, a systematic dependent syscall analysis approach, sysverify, is proposed by combining static analysis and dynamic verification together to shrink the kernel attack surface. The semantic gap between the binary executables and syscalls is bridged by analyzing the binary and the source code, which builds the mapping between the library APIs and syscalls systematically. To further reduce the attack surface at best effort, we propose a dynamic verification approach to intercept and analyze the security of the invocations of indirect-call-related or rarely invoked syscalls with low overhead. |
| title | Shrinking the Kernel Attack Surface Through Static and Dynamic Syscall Limitation |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.03720 |