PoS-CoPOR: Proof-of-Stake Consensus Protocol with Native Onion Routing Providing Scalability and DoS-Resistance
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866911193116966912 |
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| author | Homoliak, Ivan Perešíni, Martin Tamaškovič, Marek Ponek, Timotej Hellebrandt, Lukáš Malinka, Kamil |
| author_facet | Homoliak, Ivan Perešíni, Martin Tamaškovič, Marek Ponek, Timotej Hellebrandt, Lukáš Malinka, Kamil |
| contents | Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus protocols often face a trade-off between performance and security. Protocols that pre-elect leaders for subsequent rounds are vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, which can disrupt the network and compromise liveness. In this work, we present PoS-CoPOR, a single-chain PoS consensus protocol that mitigates this vulnerability by integrating a native onion routing mechanism into the consensus protocol itself. PoS-CoPOR combines stake-weighted probabilistic leader election with an anonymization layer that conceals the network identity of the next block proposer. This approach prevents targeted DoS attacks on leaders before they produce a block, thus enhancing network resilience. We implemented and evaluated PoS-CoPOR, demonstrating its ability to achieve a throughput of up to 110 tx/s with 6 nodes, even with the overhead of the anonymization layer. The results show that native anonymization can provide robust DoS resistance with only a modest impact on performance, offering a solution to build secure and scalable PoS blockchains. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_04619 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | PoS-CoPOR: Proof-of-Stake Consensus Protocol with Native Onion Routing Providing Scalability and DoS-Resistance Homoliak, Ivan Perešíni, Martin Tamaškovič, Marek Ponek, Timotej Hellebrandt, Lukáš Malinka, Kamil Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus protocols often face a trade-off between performance and security. Protocols that pre-elect leaders for subsequent rounds are vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, which can disrupt the network and compromise liveness. In this work, we present PoS-CoPOR, a single-chain PoS consensus protocol that mitigates this vulnerability by integrating a native onion routing mechanism into the consensus protocol itself. PoS-CoPOR combines stake-weighted probabilistic leader election with an anonymization layer that conceals the network identity of the next block proposer. This approach prevents targeted DoS attacks on leaders before they produce a block, thus enhancing network resilience. We implemented and evaluated PoS-CoPOR, demonstrating its ability to achieve a throughput of up to 110 tx/s with 6 nodes, even with the overhead of the anonymization layer. The results show that native anonymization can provide robust DoS resistance with only a modest impact on performance, offering a solution to build secure and scalable PoS blockchains. |
| title | PoS-CoPOR: Proof-of-Stake Consensus Protocol with Native Onion Routing Providing Scalability and DoS-Resistance |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.04619 |