Backing the Wrong Horse: How Bit-Level Netlist Augmentation can Counter Power Side Channel Attacks
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866909826062221312 |
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| author | Asghar, Ali Becher, Andreas Ziener, Daniel |
| author_facet | Asghar, Ali Becher, Andreas Ziener, Daniel |
| contents | The dependence of power-consumption on the processed data is a known vulnerability of CMOS circuits, resulting in side channels which can be exploited by power-based side channel attacks (SCAs). These attacks can extract sensitive information, such as secret keys, from the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Existing countermeasures against power-based side channel attacks focus on analyzing information leakage at the byte level. However, this approach neglects the impact of individual bits on the overall resistance of a cryptographic implementation. In this work, we present a countermeasure based on single-bit leakage. The results suggest that the proposed countermeasure cannot be broken by attacks using conventional SCA leakage models. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_04640 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Backing the Wrong Horse: How Bit-Level Netlist Augmentation can Counter Power Side Channel Attacks Asghar, Ali Becher, Andreas Ziener, Daniel Cryptography and Security The dependence of power-consumption on the processed data is a known vulnerability of CMOS circuits, resulting in side channels which can be exploited by power-based side channel attacks (SCAs). These attacks can extract sensitive information, such as secret keys, from the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Existing countermeasures against power-based side channel attacks focus on analyzing information leakage at the byte level. However, this approach neglects the impact of individual bits on the overall resistance of a cryptographic implementation. In this work, we present a countermeasure based on single-bit leakage. The results suggest that the proposed countermeasure cannot be broken by attacks using conventional SCA leakage models. |
| title | Backing the Wrong Horse: How Bit-Level Netlist Augmentation can Counter Power Side Channel Attacks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.04640 |