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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.04740 |
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| _version_ | 1866908577873002496 |
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| author | Berry, Shawn |
| author_facet | Berry, Shawn |
| contents | Traffic congestion represents a complex urban phenomenon that has been the subject of extensive research employing various modeling techniques grounded in the principles of physics and molecular theory. Although factors such as road design, accidents, weather conditions, and construction activities contribute to traffic congestion, driver behavior and decision-making are primary determinants of traffic flow efficiency. This study introduces a driver behavior archetype model that quantifies the relationship between individual driver behavior and system-level traffic outcomes through game-theoretic modeling and simulation (N = 500,000) of a three-lane roadway. Mann-Whitney U tests revealed statistically significant differences across all utility measures (p < .001, d > 2.0). In homogeneous populations, responsible drivers achieved substantially higher expected utility (M = -0.090) than irresponsible drivers (M = -1.470). However, in mixed environments (50/50), irresponsible drivers paradoxically outperformed responsible drivers (M = 0.128 vs. M = -0.127), illustrating a social dilemma wherein defection exploits cooperation. Pairwise comparisons across the six driver archetypes indicated that all irresponsible types achieved equivalent utilities while consistently surpassing responsible drivers. Lane-specific analyses revealed differential capacity patterns, with lane 1 exhibiting a more pronounced cumulative utility decline. These findings offer a robust framework for traffic management interventions, congestion prediction, and policy design that aligns individual incentives with collective efficiency. Directions for future research were also proposed. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_04740 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Traffic jams and driver behavior archetypes Berry, Shawn Theoretical Economics Traffic congestion represents a complex urban phenomenon that has been the subject of extensive research employing various modeling techniques grounded in the principles of physics and molecular theory. Although factors such as road design, accidents, weather conditions, and construction activities contribute to traffic congestion, driver behavior and decision-making are primary determinants of traffic flow efficiency. This study introduces a driver behavior archetype model that quantifies the relationship between individual driver behavior and system-level traffic outcomes through game-theoretic modeling and simulation (N = 500,000) of a three-lane roadway. Mann-Whitney U tests revealed statistically significant differences across all utility measures (p < .001, d > 2.0). In homogeneous populations, responsible drivers achieved substantially higher expected utility (M = -0.090) than irresponsible drivers (M = -1.470). However, in mixed environments (50/50), irresponsible drivers paradoxically outperformed responsible drivers (M = 0.128 vs. M = -0.127), illustrating a social dilemma wherein defection exploits cooperation. Pairwise comparisons across the six driver archetypes indicated that all irresponsible types achieved equivalent utilities while consistently surpassing responsible drivers. Lane-specific analyses revealed differential capacity patterns, with lane 1 exhibiting a more pronounced cumulative utility decline. These findings offer a robust framework for traffic management interventions, congestion prediction, and policy design that aligns individual incentives with collective efficiency. Directions for future research were also proposed. |
| title | Traffic jams and driver behavior archetypes |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.04740 |