Collusion-Resistant Quantum Secure Key Leasing Beyond Decryption
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866911194021888000 |
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| author | Kitagawa, Fuyuki Nishimaki, Ryo Pappu, Nikhil |
| author_facet | Kitagawa, Fuyuki Nishimaki, Ryo Pappu, Nikhil |
| contents | Secure key leasing (SKL) enables the holder of a secret key for a cryptographic function to temporarily lease the key using quantum information. Later, the recipient can produce a deletion certificate, which proves that they no longer have access to the secret key. The security guarantee ensures that even a malicious recipient cannot continue to evaluate the function, after producing a valid deletion certificate.
Most prior work considers an adversarial recipient that obtains a single leased key, which is insufficient for many applications. In the more realistic collusion-resistant setting, security must hold even when polynomially many keys are leased (and subsequently deleted). However, achieving collusion-resistant SKL from standard assumptions remains poorly understood, especially for functionalities beyond decryption.
We improve upon this situation by introducing new pathways for constructing collusion-resistant SKL. Our main contributions are as follows:
- A generalization of quantum-secure collusion-resistant traitor tracing called multi-level traitor tracing (MLTT), and a compiler that transforms an MLTT scheme for a primitive X into a collusion-resistant SKL scheme for primitive X.
- The first bounded collusion-resistant SKL scheme for PRFs, assuming LWE.
- A compiler that upgrades any single-key secure SKL scheme for digital signatures into one with unbounded collusion-resistance, assuming OWFs.
- A compiler that upgrades collusion-resistant SKL schemes with classical certificates to ones having verification-query resilience, assuming OWFs. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_04754 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Collusion-Resistant Quantum Secure Key Leasing Beyond Decryption Kitagawa, Fuyuki Nishimaki, Ryo Pappu, Nikhil Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security Secure key leasing (SKL) enables the holder of a secret key for a cryptographic function to temporarily lease the key using quantum information. Later, the recipient can produce a deletion certificate, which proves that they no longer have access to the secret key. The security guarantee ensures that even a malicious recipient cannot continue to evaluate the function, after producing a valid deletion certificate. Most prior work considers an adversarial recipient that obtains a single leased key, which is insufficient for many applications. In the more realistic collusion-resistant setting, security must hold even when polynomially many keys are leased (and subsequently deleted). However, achieving collusion-resistant SKL from standard assumptions remains poorly understood, especially for functionalities beyond decryption. We improve upon this situation by introducing new pathways for constructing collusion-resistant SKL. Our main contributions are as follows: - A generalization of quantum-secure collusion-resistant traitor tracing called multi-level traitor tracing (MLTT), and a compiler that transforms an MLTT scheme for a primitive X into a collusion-resistant SKL scheme for primitive X. - The first bounded collusion-resistant SKL scheme for PRFs, assuming LWE. - A compiler that upgrades any single-key secure SKL scheme for digital signatures into one with unbounded collusion-resistance, assuming OWFs. - A compiler that upgrades collusion-resistant SKL schemes with classical certificates to ones having verification-query resilience, assuming OWFs. |
| title | Collusion-Resistant Quantum Secure Key Leasing Beyond Decryption |
| topic | Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.04754 |