Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Wen, Jinbo, Kang, Jiawen, Zhang, Linfeng, Tang, Xiaoying, Tang, Jianhang, Zhang, Yang, Yang, Zhaohui, Niyato, Dusit
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.04765
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866918155050287104
author Wen, Jinbo
Kang, Jiawen
Zhang, Linfeng
Tang, Xiaoying
Tang, Jianhang
Zhang, Yang
Yang, Zhaohui
Niyato, Dusit
author_facet Wen, Jinbo
Kang, Jiawen
Zhang, Linfeng
Tang, Xiaoying
Tang, Jianhang
Zhang, Yang
Yang, Zhaohui
Niyato, Dusit
contents Web 3.0 represents the next generation of the Internet, which is widely recognized as a decentralized ecosystem that focuses on value expression and data ownership. By leveraging blockchain and artificial intelligence technologies, Web 3.0 offers unprecedented opportunities for users to create, own, and monetize their content, thereby enabling User-Generated Content (UGC) to an entirely new level. However, some self-interested users may exploit the limitations of content curation mechanisms and generate low-quality content with less effort, obtaining platform rewards under information asymmetry. Such behavior can undermine Web 3.0 performance. To this end, we propose \textit{LMM-Incentive}, a novel Large Multimodal Model (LMM)-based incentive mechanism for UGC in Web 3.0. Specifically, we propose an LMM-based contract-theoretic model to motivate users to generate high-quality UGC, thereby mitigating the adverse selection problem from information asymmetry. To alleviate potential moral hazards after contract selection, we leverage LMM agents to evaluate UGC quality, which is the primary component of the contract, utilizing prompt engineering techniques to improve the evaluation performance of LMM agents. Recognizing that traditional contract design methods cannot effectively adapt to the dynamic environment of Web 3.0, we develop an improved Mixture of Experts (MoE)-based Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) algorithm for optimal contract design. Simulation results demonstrate the superiority of the proposed MoE-based PPO algorithm over representative benchmarks in the context of contract design. Finally, we deploy the designed contract within an Ethereum smart contract framework, further validating the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_04765
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle LMM-Incentive: Large Multimodal Model-based Incentive Design for User-Generated Content in Web 3.0
Wen, Jinbo
Kang, Jiawen
Zhang, Linfeng
Tang, Xiaoying
Tang, Jianhang
Zhang, Yang
Yang, Zhaohui
Niyato, Dusit
Artificial Intelligence
Web 3.0 represents the next generation of the Internet, which is widely recognized as a decentralized ecosystem that focuses on value expression and data ownership. By leveraging blockchain and artificial intelligence technologies, Web 3.0 offers unprecedented opportunities for users to create, own, and monetize their content, thereby enabling User-Generated Content (UGC) to an entirely new level. However, some self-interested users may exploit the limitations of content curation mechanisms and generate low-quality content with less effort, obtaining platform rewards under information asymmetry. Such behavior can undermine Web 3.0 performance. To this end, we propose \textit{LMM-Incentive}, a novel Large Multimodal Model (LMM)-based incentive mechanism for UGC in Web 3.0. Specifically, we propose an LMM-based contract-theoretic model to motivate users to generate high-quality UGC, thereby mitigating the adverse selection problem from information asymmetry. To alleviate potential moral hazards after contract selection, we leverage LMM agents to evaluate UGC quality, which is the primary component of the contract, utilizing prompt engineering techniques to improve the evaluation performance of LMM agents. Recognizing that traditional contract design methods cannot effectively adapt to the dynamic environment of Web 3.0, we develop an improved Mixture of Experts (MoE)-based Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) algorithm for optimal contract design. Simulation results demonstrate the superiority of the proposed MoE-based PPO algorithm over representative benchmarks in the context of contract design. Finally, we deploy the designed contract within an Ethereum smart contract framework, further validating the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
title LMM-Incentive: Large Multimodal Model-based Incentive Design for User-Generated Content in Web 3.0
topic Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.04765