From Poisoned to Aware: Fostering Backdoor Self-Awareness in LLMs
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866909828533714944 |
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| author | Shen, Guangyu Cheng, Siyuan Xu, Xiangzhe Zhou, Yuan Guo, Hanxi Zhang, Zhuo Zhang, Xiangyu |
| author_facet | Shen, Guangyu Cheng, Siyuan Xu, Xiangzhe Zhou, Yuan Guo, Hanxi Zhang, Zhuo Zhang, Xiangyu |
| contents | Large Language Models (LLMs) can acquire deceptive behaviors through backdoor attacks, where the model executes prohibited actions whenever secret triggers appear in the input. Existing safety training methods largely fail to address this vulnerability, due to the inherent difficulty of uncovering hidden triggers implanted in the model. Motivated by recent findings on LLMs' situational awareness, we propose a novel post-training framework that cultivates self-awareness of backdoor risks and enables models to articulate implanted triggers even when they are absent from the prompt. At its core, our approach introduces an inversion-inspired reinforcement learning framework that encourages models to introspectively reason about their own behaviors and reverse-engineer the triggers responsible for misaligned outputs. Guided by curated reward signals, this process transforms a poisoned model into one capable of precisely identifying its implanted trigger. Surprisingly, we observe that such backdoor self-awareness emerges abruptly within a short training window, resembling a phase transition in capability. Building on this emergent property, we further present two complementary defense strategies for mitigating and detecting backdoor threats. Experiments on five backdoor attacks, compared against six baseline methods, demonstrate that our approach has strong potential to improve the robustness of LLMs against backdoor risks. The code is available at LLM Backdoor Self-Awareness. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_05169 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | From Poisoned to Aware: Fostering Backdoor Self-Awareness in LLMs Shen, Guangyu Cheng, Siyuan Xu, Xiangzhe Zhou, Yuan Guo, Hanxi Zhang, Zhuo Zhang, Xiangyu Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Large Language Models (LLMs) can acquire deceptive behaviors through backdoor attacks, where the model executes prohibited actions whenever secret triggers appear in the input. Existing safety training methods largely fail to address this vulnerability, due to the inherent difficulty of uncovering hidden triggers implanted in the model. Motivated by recent findings on LLMs' situational awareness, we propose a novel post-training framework that cultivates self-awareness of backdoor risks and enables models to articulate implanted triggers even when they are absent from the prompt. At its core, our approach introduces an inversion-inspired reinforcement learning framework that encourages models to introspectively reason about their own behaviors and reverse-engineer the triggers responsible for misaligned outputs. Guided by curated reward signals, this process transforms a poisoned model into one capable of precisely identifying its implanted trigger. Surprisingly, we observe that such backdoor self-awareness emerges abruptly within a short training window, resembling a phase transition in capability. Building on this emergent property, we further present two complementary defense strategies for mitigating and detecting backdoor threats. Experiments on five backdoor attacks, compared against six baseline methods, demonstrate that our approach has strong potential to improve the robustness of LLMs against backdoor risks. The code is available at LLM Backdoor Self-Awareness. |
| title | From Poisoned to Aware: Fostering Backdoor Self-Awareness in LLMs |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.05169 |