Evolution of social behaviors in noisy environments
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866909829153423360 |
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| author | Wang, Guocheng Su, Qi Wang, Long Plotkin, Joshua B. |
| author_facet | Wang, Guocheng Su, Qi Wang, Long Plotkin, Joshua B. |
| contents | Evolutionary game theory offers a general framework to study how behaviors evolve by social learning in a population. This body of theory can accommodate a range of social dilemmas, or games, as well as real-world complexities such as spatial structure or behaviors conditioned on reputations. Nonetheless, this approach typically assumes a deterministic payoff structure for social interactions. Here, we extend evolutionary game theory to account for random changes in the social environment, so that mutual cooperation may bring different rewards today than it brings tomorrow, for example. Even when such environmental noise is unbiased, we find it can have a qualitative impact on the behaviors that evolve in a population. Noisy payoffs can permit the stable co-existence of cooperators and defectors in the prisoner's dilemma, for example, as well as bistability in snowdrift games and stable limit cycles in rock-paper-scissors games -- dynamical phenomena that cannot occur in the absence of noise. We conclude by discussing the relevance of our framework to scenarios where the nature of social interactions is subject to external perturbations. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_05521 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Evolution of social behaviors in noisy environments Wang, Guocheng Su, Qi Wang, Long Plotkin, Joshua B. Physics and Society Populations and Evolution Evolutionary game theory offers a general framework to study how behaviors evolve by social learning in a population. This body of theory can accommodate a range of social dilemmas, or games, as well as real-world complexities such as spatial structure or behaviors conditioned on reputations. Nonetheless, this approach typically assumes a deterministic payoff structure for social interactions. Here, we extend evolutionary game theory to account for random changes in the social environment, so that mutual cooperation may bring different rewards today than it brings tomorrow, for example. Even when such environmental noise is unbiased, we find it can have a qualitative impact on the behaviors that evolve in a population. Noisy payoffs can permit the stable co-existence of cooperators and defectors in the prisoner's dilemma, for example, as well as bistability in snowdrift games and stable limit cycles in rock-paper-scissors games -- dynamical phenomena that cannot occur in the absence of noise. We conclude by discussing the relevance of our framework to scenarios where the nature of social interactions is subject to external perturbations. |
| title | Evolution of social behaviors in noisy environments |
| topic | Physics and Society Populations and Evolution |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.05521 |