Communication Enables Cooperation in LLM Agents: A Comparison with Curriculum-Based Approaches
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866912960929071104 |
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| author | Madmoun, Hachem Lahlou, Salem |
| author_facet | Madmoun, Hachem Lahlou, Salem |
| contents | Eliciting cooperation in multi-agent LLM systems is critical for AI alignment. We investigate two approaches: direct communication and curriculum learning. In a 4-player Stag Hunt, a one-word "cheap talk" channel increases cooperation from 0% to 96.7%, demonstrating communication as a robust coordination mechanism. In contrast, we find that curriculum learning is highly sensitive to design choices: our pedagogical curriculum through progressively complex games reduced agent payoffs by 27.4% in an Iterated Public Goods Game with Punishment, demonstrating that optimizing for short-term rationality can actively undermine alignment goals. Qualitative analysis reveals that curricula emphasizing defection-equilibrium games can induce "learned pessimism" in agents. These findings suggest that for coordination problems, simple communication protocols may be more reliable than experience-based training, and that curriculum design for social dilemmas requires careful attention to the strategic lessons embedded in game sequences. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_05748 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Communication Enables Cooperation in LLM Agents: A Comparison with Curriculum-Based Approaches Madmoun, Hachem Lahlou, Salem Machine Learning Eliciting cooperation in multi-agent LLM systems is critical for AI alignment. We investigate two approaches: direct communication and curriculum learning. In a 4-player Stag Hunt, a one-word "cheap talk" channel increases cooperation from 0% to 96.7%, demonstrating communication as a robust coordination mechanism. In contrast, we find that curriculum learning is highly sensitive to design choices: our pedagogical curriculum through progressively complex games reduced agent payoffs by 27.4% in an Iterated Public Goods Game with Punishment, demonstrating that optimizing for short-term rationality can actively undermine alignment goals. Qualitative analysis reveals that curricula emphasizing defection-equilibrium games can induce "learned pessimism" in agents. These findings suggest that for coordination problems, simple communication protocols may be more reliable than experience-based training, and that curriculum design for social dilemmas requires careful attention to the strategic lessons embedded in game sequences. |
| title | Communication Enables Cooperation in LLM Agents: A Comparison with Curriculum-Based Approaches |
| topic | Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.05748 |