Breaking Precision Time: OS Vulnerability Exploits Against IEEE 1588
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866914080221036544 |
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| author | Soomro, Muhammad Abdullah Anwar, Fatima Muhammad |
| author_facet | Soomro, Muhammad Abdullah Anwar, Fatima Muhammad |
| contents | The Precision Time Protocol (PTP), standardized as IEEE 1588, provides sub-microsecond synchronization across distributed systems and underpins critical infrastructure in telecommunications, finance, power systems, and industrial automation. While prior work has extensively analyzed PTP's vulnerability to network-based attacks, prompting the development of cryptographic protections and anomaly detectors, these defenses presume an uncompromised host. In this paper, we identify and exploit a critical blind spot in current threat models: kernel-level adversaries operating from within the host running the PTP stack. We present the first systematic study of kernel-rooted attacks on PTP, demonstrating how privileged attackers can manipulate system time by corrupting key interfaces without altering PTP network traffic. We implement three attack primitives, constant offset, progressive skew, and random jitter, using in-kernel payloads, and evaluate their impact on the widely used ptp4l and phc2sys daemons. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can silently destabilize clock synchronization, bypassing existing PTP security extensions. These findings highlight the urgent need to reconsider host-level trust assumptions and integrate kernel integrity into the design of secure time synchronization systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_06421 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Breaking Precision Time: OS Vulnerability Exploits Against IEEE 1588 Soomro, Muhammad Abdullah Anwar, Fatima Muhammad Cryptography and Security The Precision Time Protocol (PTP), standardized as IEEE 1588, provides sub-microsecond synchronization across distributed systems and underpins critical infrastructure in telecommunications, finance, power systems, and industrial automation. While prior work has extensively analyzed PTP's vulnerability to network-based attacks, prompting the development of cryptographic protections and anomaly detectors, these defenses presume an uncompromised host. In this paper, we identify and exploit a critical blind spot in current threat models: kernel-level adversaries operating from within the host running the PTP stack. We present the first systematic study of kernel-rooted attacks on PTP, demonstrating how privileged attackers can manipulate system time by corrupting key interfaces without altering PTP network traffic. We implement three attack primitives, constant offset, progressive skew, and random jitter, using in-kernel payloads, and evaluate their impact on the widely used ptp4l and phc2sys daemons. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can silently destabilize clock synchronization, bypassing existing PTP security extensions. These findings highlight the urgent need to reconsider host-level trust assumptions and integrate kernel integrity into the design of secure time synchronization systems. |
| title | Breaking Precision Time: OS Vulnerability Exploits Against IEEE 1588 |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.06421 |