Poisoning Attacks on LLMs Require a Near-constant Number of Poison Samples

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Souly, Alexandra, Rando, Javier, Chapman, Ed, Davies, Xander, Hasircioglu, Burak, Shereen, Ezzeldin, Mougan, Carlos, Mavroudis, Vasilios, Jones, Erik, Hicks, Chris, Carlini, Nicholas, Gal, Yarin, Kirk, Robert
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Souly, Alexandra
Rando, Javier
Chapman, Ed
Davies, Xander
Hasircioglu, Burak
Shereen, Ezzeldin
Mougan, Carlos
Mavroudis, Vasilios
Jones, Erik
Hicks, Chris
Carlini, Nicholas
Gal, Yarin
Kirk, Robert
author_facet Souly, Alexandra
Rando, Javier
Chapman, Ed
Davies, Xander
Hasircioglu, Burak
Shereen, Ezzeldin
Mougan, Carlos
Mavroudis, Vasilios
Jones, Erik
Hicks, Chris
Carlini, Nicholas
Gal, Yarin
Kirk, Robert
contents Poisoning attacks can compromise the safety of large language models (LLMs) by injecting malicious documents into their training data. Existing work has studied pretraining poisoning assuming adversaries control a percentage of the training corpus. However, for large models, even small percentages translate to impractically large amounts of data. This work demonstrates for the first time that poisoning attacks instead require a near-constant number of documents regardless of dataset size. We conduct the largest pretraining poisoning experiments to date, pretraining models from 600M to 13B parameters on chinchilla-optimal datasets (6B to 260B tokens). We find that 250 poisoned documents similarly compromise models across all model and dataset sizes, despite the largest models training on more than 20 times more clean data. We also run smaller-scale experiments to ablate factors that could influence attack success, including broader ratios of poisoned to clean data and non-random distributions of poisoned samples. Finally, we demonstrate the same dynamics for poisoning during fine-tuning. Altogether, our results suggest that injecting backdoors through data poisoning may be easier for large models than previously believed as the number of poisons required does not scale up with model size, highlighting the need for more research on defences to mitigate this risk in future models.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_07192
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Poisoning Attacks on LLMs Require a Near-constant Number of Poison Samples
Souly, Alexandra
Rando, Javier
Chapman, Ed
Davies, Xander
Hasircioglu, Burak
Shereen, Ezzeldin
Mougan, Carlos
Mavroudis, Vasilios
Jones, Erik
Hicks, Chris
Carlini, Nicholas
Gal, Yarin
Kirk, Robert
Machine Learning
Poisoning attacks can compromise the safety of large language models (LLMs) by injecting malicious documents into their training data. Existing work has studied pretraining poisoning assuming adversaries control a percentage of the training corpus. However, for large models, even small percentages translate to impractically large amounts of data. This work demonstrates for the first time that poisoning attacks instead require a near-constant number of documents regardless of dataset size. We conduct the largest pretraining poisoning experiments to date, pretraining models from 600M to 13B parameters on chinchilla-optimal datasets (6B to 260B tokens). We find that 250 poisoned documents similarly compromise models across all model and dataset sizes, despite the largest models training on more than 20 times more clean data. We also run smaller-scale experiments to ablate factors that could influence attack success, including broader ratios of poisoned to clean data and non-random distributions of poisoned samples. Finally, we demonstrate the same dynamics for poisoning during fine-tuning. Altogether, our results suggest that injecting backdoors through data poisoning may be easier for large models than previously believed as the number of poisons required does not scale up with model size, highlighting the need for more research on defences to mitigate this risk in future models.
title Poisoning Attacks on LLMs Require a Near-constant Number of Poison Samples
topic Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.07192