A Minrank-based Encryption Scheme à la Alekhnovich-Regev
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866915541271183360 |
|---|---|
| author | Debris-Alazard, Thomas Gaborit, Philippe Neveu, Romaric Ruatta, Olivier |
| author_facet | Debris-Alazard, Thomas Gaborit, Philippe Neveu, Romaric Ruatta, Olivier |
| contents | Introduced in 2003 and 2005, Alekhnovich and Regev' schemes were the first public-key encryptions whose security is only based on the average hardness of decoding random linear codes and LWE, without other security assumptions. Such security guarantees made them very popular, being at the origin of the now standardized HQC or Kyber.
We present an adaptation of Alekhnovich and Regev' encryption scheme whose security is only based on the hardness of a slight variation of MinRank, the so-called stationary-MinRank problem. We succeeded to reach this strong security guarantee by showing that stationary-MinRank benefits from a search-to-decision reduction. Our scheme therefore brings a partial answer to the long-standing open question of building an encryption scheme whose security relies solely on the hardness of MinRank.
Finally, we show after a thoroughly security analysis that our scheme is practical and competitive with other encryption schemes admitting such strong security guarantees. Our scheme is slightly less efficient than FrodoKEM, but much more efficient than Alekhnovich and Regev' original schemes, with possibilities of improvements by considering more structure, in the same way as HQC and Kyber. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_07584 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Minrank-based Encryption Scheme à la Alekhnovich-Regev Debris-Alazard, Thomas Gaborit, Philippe Neveu, Romaric Ruatta, Olivier Cryptography and Security Introduced in 2003 and 2005, Alekhnovich and Regev' schemes were the first public-key encryptions whose security is only based on the average hardness of decoding random linear codes and LWE, without other security assumptions. Such security guarantees made them very popular, being at the origin of the now standardized HQC or Kyber. We present an adaptation of Alekhnovich and Regev' encryption scheme whose security is only based on the hardness of a slight variation of MinRank, the so-called stationary-MinRank problem. We succeeded to reach this strong security guarantee by showing that stationary-MinRank benefits from a search-to-decision reduction. Our scheme therefore brings a partial answer to the long-standing open question of building an encryption scheme whose security relies solely on the hardness of MinRank. Finally, we show after a thoroughly security analysis that our scheme is practical and competitive with other encryption schemes admitting such strong security guarantees. Our scheme is slightly less efficient than FrodoKEM, but much more efficient than Alekhnovich and Regev' original schemes, with possibilities of improvements by considering more structure, in the same way as HQC and Kyber. |
| title | A Minrank-based Encryption Scheme à la Alekhnovich-Regev |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.07584 |