Invisible to Humans, Triggered by Agents: Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks on Mobile Vision-Language Agents

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Ding, Renhua, Yang, Xiao, Fang, Zhengwei, Luo, Jun, He, Kun, Zhu, Jun
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2025
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author Ding, Renhua
Yang, Xiao
Fang, Zhengwei
Luo, Jun
He, Kun
Zhu, Jun
author_facet Ding, Renhua
Yang, Xiao
Fang, Zhengwei
Luo, Jun
He, Kun
Zhu, Jun
contents Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) empower autonomous mobile agents, yet their security under realistic mobile deployment constraints remains underexplored. While agents are vulnerable to visual prompt injections, stealthily executing such attacks without requiring system-level privileges remains challenging, as existing methods rely on persistent visual manipulations that are noticeable to users. We uncover a consistent discrepancy between human and agent interactions: automated agents generate near-zero contact touch signals. Building on this insight, we propose a new attack paradigm, agent-only perceptual injection, where malicious content is exposed only during agent interactions, while remaining not readily perceived by human users. To accommodate mobile UI constraints and one-shot interaction settings, we introduce HG-IDA*, an efficient one-shot optimization method for constructing jailbreak prompts that evade LVLM safety filters. Experiments demonstrate that our approach induces unauthorized cross-app actions, achieving 82.5% planning and 75.0% execution hijack rates on GPT-4o. Our findings highlight a previously underexplored attack surface in mobile agent systems and underscore the need for defenses that incorporate interaction-level signals.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_07809
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Invisible to Humans, Triggered by Agents: Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks on Mobile Vision-Language Agents
Ding, Renhua
Yang, Xiao
Fang, Zhengwei
Luo, Jun
He, Kun
Zhu, Jun
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) empower autonomous mobile agents, yet their security under realistic mobile deployment constraints remains underexplored. While agents are vulnerable to visual prompt injections, stealthily executing such attacks without requiring system-level privileges remains challenging, as existing methods rely on persistent visual manipulations that are noticeable to users. We uncover a consistent discrepancy between human and agent interactions: automated agents generate near-zero contact touch signals. Building on this insight, we propose a new attack paradigm, agent-only perceptual injection, where malicious content is exposed only during agent interactions, while remaining not readily perceived by human users. To accommodate mobile UI constraints and one-shot interaction settings, we introduce HG-IDA*, an efficient one-shot optimization method for constructing jailbreak prompts that evade LVLM safety filters. Experiments demonstrate that our approach induces unauthorized cross-app actions, achieving 82.5% planning and 75.0% execution hijack rates on GPT-4o. Our findings highlight a previously underexplored attack surface in mobile agent systems and underscore the need for defenses that incorporate interaction-level signals.
title Invisible to Humans, Triggered by Agents: Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks on Mobile Vision-Language Agents
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.07809