Strategic Communication under Threat: Learning Information Trade-offs in Pursuit-Evasion Games
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866909832522498048 |
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| author | La Gatta, Valerio Mutzari, Dolev Kraus, Sarit Subrahmanian, VS |
| author_facet | La Gatta, Valerio Mutzari, Dolev Kraus, Sarit Subrahmanian, VS |
| contents | Adversarial environments require agents to navigate a key strategic trade-off: acquiring information enhances situational awareness, but may simultaneously expose them to threats. To investigate this tension, we formulate a PursuitEvasion-Exposure-Concealment Game (PEEC) in which a pursuer agent must decide when to communicate in order to obtain the evader's position. Each communication reveals the pursuer's location, increasing the risk of being targeted. Both agents learn their movement policies via reinforcement learning, while the pursuer additionally learns a communication policy that balances observability and risk. We propose SHADOW (Strategic-communication Hybrid Action Decision-making under partial Observation for Warfare), a multi-headed sequential reinforcement learning framework that integrates continuous navigation control, discrete communication actions, and opponent modeling for behavior prediction. Empirical evaluations show that SHADOW pursuers achieve higher success rates than six competitive baselines. Our ablation study confirms that temporal sequence modeling and opponent modeling are critical for effective decision-making. Finally, our sensitivity analysis reveals that the learned policies generalize well across varying communication risks and physical asymmetries between agents. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_07813 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic Communication under Threat: Learning Information Trade-offs in Pursuit-Evasion Games La Gatta, Valerio Mutzari, Dolev Kraus, Sarit Subrahmanian, VS Artificial Intelligence Adversarial environments require agents to navigate a key strategic trade-off: acquiring information enhances situational awareness, but may simultaneously expose them to threats. To investigate this tension, we formulate a PursuitEvasion-Exposure-Concealment Game (PEEC) in which a pursuer agent must decide when to communicate in order to obtain the evader's position. Each communication reveals the pursuer's location, increasing the risk of being targeted. Both agents learn their movement policies via reinforcement learning, while the pursuer additionally learns a communication policy that balances observability and risk. We propose SHADOW (Strategic-communication Hybrid Action Decision-making under partial Observation for Warfare), a multi-headed sequential reinforcement learning framework that integrates continuous navigation control, discrete communication actions, and opponent modeling for behavior prediction. Empirical evaluations show that SHADOW pursuers achieve higher success rates than six competitive baselines. Our ablation study confirms that temporal sequence modeling and opponent modeling are critical for effective decision-making. Finally, our sensitivity analysis reveals that the learned policies generalize well across varying communication risks and physical asymmetries between agents. |
| title | Strategic Communication under Threat: Learning Information Trade-offs in Pursuit-Evasion Games |
| topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.07813 |