Correlated Perfect Equilibrium

Fuente: arXiv
Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Huang, Wanying, Kline, J. Jude, Man, Priscilla
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
_version_ 1866909832603238400
author Huang, Wanying
Kline, J. Jude
Man, Priscilla
author_facet Huang, Wanying
Kline, J. Jude
Man, Priscilla
contents We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE never assigns positive probability to any weakly dominated strategy. We provide a dual representation of CPE and demonstrate how it differs from two existing refinements of correlated equilibrium--acceptable correlated equilibrium (Myerson, 1986) and perfect direct correlated equilibrium (Dhillon-Mertens, 1996)--through examples.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_07906
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Correlated Perfect Equilibrium
Huang, Wanying
Kline, J. Jude
Man, Priscilla
Theoretical Economics
We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE never assigns positive probability to any weakly dominated strategy. We provide a dual representation of CPE and demonstrate how it differs from two existing refinements of correlated equilibrium--acceptable correlated equilibrium (Myerson, 1986) and perfect direct correlated equilibrium (Dhillon-Mertens, 1996)--through examples.
title Correlated Perfect Equilibrium
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.07906