The (No) Value of Commitment
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866914082538389504 |
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| author | Hancart, Nathan |
| author_facet | Hancart, Nathan |
| contents | I provide a sufficient condition under which a principal does not benefit from committing to a mechanism in economic models represented by a maximisation problem under constraints. These problems include mechanism design, principal-agent models or sender-receiver games. In principal-agent problems, this condition holds if the agent has a finite strategy space and the principal's value function is continuous in the mechanism. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_07994 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The (No) Value of Commitment Hancart, Nathan Theoretical Economics I provide a sufficient condition under which a principal does not benefit from committing to a mechanism in economic models represented by a maximisation problem under constraints. These problems include mechanism design, principal-agent models or sender-receiver games. In principal-agent problems, this condition holds if the agent has a finite strategy space and the principal's value function is continuous in the mechanism. |
| title | The (No) Value of Commitment |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.07994 |