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Arrow's Impossibility Theorem as a Generalisation of Condorcet's Paradox

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Livson, Ori, Prokopenko, Mikhail
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2025
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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