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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09675 |
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| _version_ | 1866918158525267968 |
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| author | Sghaier, Khaoula Hammi, Badis Gharbi, Ghada Merdrignac, Pierre Parrend, Pierre Verna, Didier |
| author_facet | Sghaier, Khaoula Hammi, Badis Gharbi, Ghada Merdrignac, Pierre Parrend, Pierre Verna, Didier |
| contents | Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) introduce innovative features that extend the vehicle's lifecycle through the integration of outsourced applications and continuous Over-The-Air (OTA) updates. This shift necessitates robust cybersecurity and system resilience. While research on Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAV) has been extensive, there is a lack of clarity in distinguishing SDVs from non-SDVs and a need to consolidate cybersecurity research. SDVs, with their extensive connectivity, have a broader attack surface. Besides, their software-centric nature introduces additional vulnerabilities. This paper provides a comprehensive examination of SDVs, detailing their ecosystem, enabling technologies, and the principal cyberattack entry points that arise from their architectural and operational characteristics. We also introduce a novel, layered taxonomy that maps concrete exploit techniques onto core SDV properties and attack paths, and use it to analyze representative studies and experimental approaches. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_09675 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Advancing Security in Software-Defined Vehicles: A Comprehensive Survey and Taxonomy Sghaier, Khaoula Hammi, Badis Gharbi, Ghada Merdrignac, Pierre Parrend, Pierre Verna, Didier Cryptography and Security Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) introduce innovative features that extend the vehicle's lifecycle through the integration of outsourced applications and continuous Over-The-Air (OTA) updates. This shift necessitates robust cybersecurity and system resilience. While research on Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAV) has been extensive, there is a lack of clarity in distinguishing SDVs from non-SDVs and a need to consolidate cybersecurity research. SDVs, with their extensive connectivity, have a broader attack surface. Besides, their software-centric nature introduces additional vulnerabilities. This paper provides a comprehensive examination of SDVs, detailing their ecosystem, enabling technologies, and the principal cyberattack entry points that arise from their architectural and operational characteristics. We also introduce a novel, layered taxonomy that maps concrete exploit techniques onto core SDV properties and attack paths, and use it to analyze representative studies and experimental approaches. |
| title | Advancing Security in Software-Defined Vehicles: A Comprehensive Survey and Taxonomy |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09675 |