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Emergence of Homophily under Contextual Mechanisms

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Weng, Jiaxing, Yang, Haijun, Wang, Tongyu
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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