Token Is All You Price
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866915956897349632 |
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| author | Zhong, Weijie |
| author_facet | Zhong, Weijie |
| contents | A seller of a dynamic information service under an information-throughput constraint screens buyers who privately differ in urgency. We characterize the revenue-optimal mechanism: deploy a single preference-aligned belief process; screen buyers with a menu of stopping-time caps. The result rationalizes tokenized GenAI pricing, from consumer subscription tiers to B2B API service tiers. Extensions to heterogeneous valuations and endogenous reasoning quality preserve the qualitative conclusions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_09859 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Token Is All You Price Zhong, Weijie Theoretical Economics Artificial Intelligence A seller of a dynamic information service under an information-throughput constraint screens buyers who privately differ in urgency. We characterize the revenue-optimal mechanism: deploy a single preference-aligned belief process; screen buyers with a menu of stopping-time caps. The result rationalizes tokenized GenAI pricing, from consumer subscription tiers to B2B API service tiers. Extensions to heterogeneous valuations and endogenous reasoning quality preserve the qualitative conclusions. |
| title | Token Is All You Price |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09859 |